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THE DUTY OF MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL TO 
AN ACCUSED 
Alfred Avins* 
ARECENT decision of the United States Court of Military Appeals barring the use of non-lawyers as defense counsel 
before courts-martial even at the accused's request1 is symptomatic 
of the increasing professionalization of military law practice. This 
is a matter. of interest not only to reserve officers who are lawyers, 
but also to the civilian bar generally and especially to recent law 
school graduates who will, in fulfilling their military obligations, 
constitute the quarter to half of military lawyers on active duty. 
Especially for these neophytes whose first legal experience will be 
in forums dissimilar from those they have studied, a review of the 
professional standards required for military courts should be of 
assistance. 
Civilian lawyers entering the military justice system in a steady 
stream since the country was founded and attorneys coming in 
during wartime have brought with them their basic attitudes to-
ward criminal law administration and have gradually woven these 
standards into the warp and woof of the military law, so that today 
civilian criminal law administration standards have been almost 
completely assimilated into the military justice system. This as-
similation is of particular significance in attorney-client relation-
ships and the duty of a defense counsel toward an accused whom 
he represents, because so many beginning judge advocates serve in 
this capacity. . 
Since the time defense counsel formally represented accused 
before them, military courts have required that counsel govern 
their relationship to the accused according to the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics.2 Today, "the substance of these Canons is found 
also in the Manual for Courts-Martial, wherein it is stated that the 
defense counsel is charged with the duty 'to represent the accused 
• Attorney, National Labor Relations Board.-Ed. 
1 United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958). 
2 See C.M.O. 7-1928, p. 9; and C.M.O. 2-1944, p. 251, in which counsel for accused 
were censured for violation of the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association. See 
the recent citation to the Canons of Ethics in United States v. Harris, 24 C.M.R. 698 
(A.C.M. 1957), wherein the board dealt with attorney-client relationships. In LEGAL AND 
LEGISLATIVE BASIS, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1951, at p. 27, ,r42, it is stated, of the 
manual: "Paragraph 42 provides generally for conduct of counsel. Appropriate portions 
of the canons of ethics of the American Bar Association, some of which are set out in Naval 
Courts and Boards, are included. The paragraph sets up standards for a military bar." 
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with undivided fidelity, and not to divulge his secrets or confidence' 
(MCM, 1951, par. 48c). A violation of these Canons may be 
ground for reversal or other corrective action. . . . "3 
This article is designed to study the manner in which those 
Canons of Professional Ethics have been assimilated into the ad-
ministration of military justice and made the standards for the 
duty of a military defense counsel. 
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DUTIES 
Professionalization of military justice administration was not 
always the rule. Following the criminal court practice during the 
latter half of the eighteenth century that a defendant was not per-
mitted to defend by counsel in felony cases because the court itself 
was supposed to be counsel for the prisoner,4 English courts-martial 
would not permit the accused's legal adviser to address the court or 
examine witnesses.5 Instead, the judge advocate was supposed to 
consider himself as counsel for the accused in addition to his duties 
as crown prosecutor and impartial legal adviser to the court.6 Ex-
clusion of counsel's participation was also justified on alleged igno-
rance of military law7 on the part of barristers, and it was "an ad-
mitted maxim on all courts-martial that counsel are not to interfere 
in the proceedings, or to offer the slightest remark, much less to 
plead or argue.''8 Although in 1836 Parliament abolished the rule 
prohibiting counsel in felony cases, the analogous military practice 
persisted until World War l,9 and it is only in recent times that 
English military prisoners have had the right to counsel.10 
Although the English r,ule that a defendant in a felony case was 
not allowed counsel had been expressly rejected in the United 
3 United States v. Reynolds, (A.C.M. 1955) 19 C.M.R. 850 at 852. 
4 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 61 (1932). See also Becker and Heidlebaugh, "The 
Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,'' 28 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 351 (1953). 
5 2 McARTHUR, NAVAL AND MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL, 4th ed., 46 (1813); DELAFONS, 
A TREATISE ON NAVAL COURTS-MARTIAL 165 (1805). Cf. ADYE, A TREATISE ON CoURTS-
MARTIAL, 4th ed., 194 (1797); KENNEDY, GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL 259 (1825). This was 
adhered to even in the most important cases. See TRIAL OF HoN. AuGusros KEPPEL, AD-
MIRAL OF THE BLUE (1779); COURT-MARTIAL OF ADMIRAL LORD GAMBIER (1810). 
6 BENET, MILITARY LAw, 6th ed., 242-257 (1866), indicates his anomalous function. 
See also KENNEDY, GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL 259 (1825). 
7 TYTLER, AN ESSAY ON MILITARY LAW, 2d ed., 250 (1806). 
8 SIMMONS, COURTS-MARTIAL, 4th ed., 183 (1852). 
9 HICKMAN, NAVAL COURTS-MARTIAL 74 (1851); STEPHENS, GIFFORD AND SMITH, 
MANUAL oF NAVAL LAw, 3d ed., 80 (1901), 4th ed., 70 (1912). See also LEWIS, AUSTRALIAN 
MILITARY LAW 195 (1936). 
10 Rule 79 (2) of the Army Rules of Procedure for Courts-Martial provides for his 
duties. See MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, Rules and Procedure (1956). And see Griffith, 
"Report of the Army and Air Force Courts-Martial Committee,'' 12 MoD. L. REV. 223 at 
226 (1949). 
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States at the time of the Revolution,11 this anachronism was re-
tained in American court-martial procedure.12 The resulting 
divergence between courts-martial practice and the notion of due 
process as exemplified by the Sixth Amendment13 caused sharp 
criticism of military court procedure. As early as the War of 1812, 
one military textwriter noted that "the people of this country 
are very tenacious of the privilege of employing attorneys to plead 
on their behalf; and the refusal of courts martial to grant this 
indulgence, has sometimes excited no small degree of sen-
sibility .... "14 
Shortly thereafter, some courts-martial began to exhibit a 
measure of recognition to Sixth Amendment requirements, and 
in trials of importance between the War of 1812 and the Civil 
War limited use of counsel was occasionally permitted with the 
court's permission.15 The influx of civilian lawyers into the mili-
tary service during the Civil War further tended to erode the old 
prohibitions against appearance of counsel for accused in court-
martial cases. Indeed, while standard textwriters still adhered to 
the rule forbidding counsel to address the court or examine 
witnesses, they noted that by then it had become customary to 
permit an attorney to read the accused's defense or summation to 
the court-martial.16 
The assimilation of rules of general criminal law practice into 
the court-martial system was aided by the establishment of the 
Bureau of Military Justice in 186417 and the opinion of General 
11 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 61 (1932). 
12 MACOMB, A TREATISE ON MARTIAL LAW AND COURTS-MARTIAL 93-96 (1809); O'BRIEN, 
AMERICAN MILITARY LAws 223,224 (1846); MILITIA REPORTER 253, 284 (1810). A full review 
of the earliest post-Revolution cases is contained in Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill 
of Rights: The Original Practice: I," 72 HARv. L. REv. l at 27-36 (1958). 
13 Compare Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice: I," 
72 HARV. L. REv. I (1958), with Henderson, "Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The 
Original Understanding," 71 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1957). Tending to support Col. Wiener's 
view, but not mentioned by him, is Col. Henley's Case, 3 AM. ST. TR. 806 at 840 (1778), 
where Lt. Col. William Tudor, first Judge Advocate of the Continental Army under George 
Washington, stated that an accused was not permitted to have defense counsel in courts-
martial. 
14 MALTBY, A TREATISE ON COURTS l\fARTIAL 75 (1813). 
15 TRIAL OF LT. J. ABBOTI 3, 128 (1822); NAVAL COURT MARTIAL OF COMMANDER 
ALEXANDER s. l\fACKENZIE AND REvmw BY JAMES FENIMORE COOPER 8, 228 (1844); Rear 
Admiral Charles Wilkes' Court-Martial, June 30, 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. Ex. Doc. 
102, p. 4. Mackenzie's attorneys before the court-martial later represented him in the civil 
courts in related proceedings. See Wilson v. Mackenzie, 7 Hill (N.Y.) 95, 42 Am. Dec. 51 
(1845); United States v. Mackenzie, (S.D. N.Y. 1843) 30 Fed. Cas. 1160, #18,313. 
16 DE HART, COURTS-MARTIAL 132 (1859); BENET, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW, 6th 
ed., 75, 133 (1866); HARWOOD, UNITED STATES NAVAL COURTS-MARTIAL 113 (1867). 
17 See Prugh, "Colonel William Winthrop: The Tradition of the Military Lawyers," 
42 A.B.A.J. 126 (1956). 
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Holt, the first Judge Advocate General, that "the accused is en-
titled to counsel upon his trial as a right.''18 Holt, a distinguished, 
lawyer and former Secretary of War, further declared: 
"In tlJ_is country no such view as that advanced by Napier, 
of a separation between the general rules of practice on mili-
tary trials and those prevailing in the courts of law, is known 
to have been entertained. Such rules are indeed, in our pro-
cedure, as far as possible assimilated."19 
The close of the Civil War lessened public interest in military 
justice and retarded the liberal trend.20 However, Civil War gains 
were not obliterated. In 1873, the New York Court of Appeals 
held that an accused before a national guard court-martial had a 
right to counsel,21 and six years later a standard textwriter ad-
vanced the same view.22 Nevertheless, Winthrop as late as 1895 
declares that the employment of defense counsel is a "privilege 
only,''23 although he noted that objections to the participation of 
counsel were rare. 
For the first time in 1890, Army Regulations provided for the 
appointment of defense counsel.24 Five years later, the first Manual 
for Courts-Martial set forth in rudimentary fashion the duties of 
counsel toward the accused as follows: 
"An officer detailed as counsel for a soldier before a gen-
eral court-martial should guard the interests of the accused by 
all honorable and legitimate means known to the law .... He 
should not obstruct the proceedings with frivolous or mani-
festly useless objections."25 
The 1905 Army manual added the qualification that the means 
employed to protect the accused should be "not inconsistent with 
military relations,"26 a provision apparently inhibiting counsel 
lBWINTIIROP, DIGEST OPINIONS JAG 1862-1868, 3d ed., 127, #1 (1868). 
19 Id. at 336. 
20 See HOWLAND, DIGEST OPINIONS JAG 1862-1912, 509, July 1874 (1912). 
21 People ex rel. Garling v. Van Allen, 55 N.Y. 31 (1873). This case overruled an 
earlier trend against the right to counsel. See Rathbun v. Sawyer, 15 Wend. (N.Y.) 451 
(1836); People ex rel. Underwood v. Daniell, 6 Lans. (N.Y.) 44 (1871), affirmed without 
discussion of this point in 50 N.Y. 274 (1872). See subsequent developments on the state 
level in comment, 41 CoRN. L.Q. 457 (1956). 
22 IVES, MILITARY LAw 125, 127 (1879). 
23 WINTIIRoP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS, 2d ed., 166 (1895; 1920 reprint). See 
also United States v. Mathis, (A.C.M.S. 1952) 6 C.M.R. 661 at 667. 
24 Ibid. 
25 MANUAL FOR CoURTS·MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1895, p. 25. 
26 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1905, p. 26. 
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from raising defenses reflecting on the accused's superiors.27 How-
ever, this manual did strengthen the accused's privilege of employ-
ing counsel,28 and when in 1916 the Articles of War were revised, 
Article 17 provided that "The accused shall have the right to be 
represented before the court by counsel of his own selection for 
his defense." This provision was carried forward in amplified 
form in the 1920 Articles of War, which in Article II also required 
the convening authority to appoint counsel for the accused before 
general and special courts-martial. Thus, it was not until the end 
of World War I that military courts were required to concern 
themselves with the duties of counsel toward the accused. 
The 1917 manual thus described counsel's duty toward an 
accused: 
"An officer acting as counsel before a general or special 
court-martial should perform such duties as usually devolve 
upon the counsel for a defendant before civil courts in crimi-
nal cases. He should guard the interests of the accused by all 
honorable and legitimate means known to the law."29 
The above provision was carried over into the 1921 manual,30 
and, in addition, the duty was imposed upon him that "in case of 
personal interest in the trial or of personal hostility toward the 
accused or toward the accuser he should apply to the convening 
authority to be relieved."31 These provisions were carried for-
ward into the 1928 manual,32 and, in addition, for the first time, 
paraphrasing from the Canons of Ethics, it was specifically set 
forth: "It is his duty to undertake the defense regardless of his 
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; to disclose to the 
accused any interest he may have in or in connection with the case 
which might influence the accused in the selection of counsel; to 
represent the accused with undivided fidelity, and not to divulge 
his secrets or confidence."33 The 1949 manual incorporated these 
27 Cf. C.M.O. 6-1938, p. 7, interpreting a similar policy. 
28 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1905, p. 25. But see HOWLAND, DIGEST 
OPINIONS JAG 1862-1912, 267 (1912), containing an 1899 opinion that a claim made against 
the United States by an attorney for services rendered as counsel for an accused officer in 
a court-martial trial was without merit. See also DIGEST OPINIONS JAG 1912-1940, §374, 
Feb. 2, 1915 (1942). 
29 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1917, ,rl09, p. 52. 
80 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1921, ,rI07b, P· 92. 
81 Id. at ,rI07f, p. 93. 
82MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1928, ,r,r43, 45, pp. 33, 35. 
88Id. at 35. 
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provisions in substantially unchanged form.34 Likewise, these re-
quirements were further carried into and amplified in the present 
manual,35 so that it can be said that "The duties of any counsel for 
the defense parallel closely the duties of any lawyer to his client 
and the matters set out in the manual are similar to those in 
previous service manuals."36 
Naval law had a parallel development in regard to the right to 
counsel. By the turn of the century, the application of the Sixth 
Amendment to courts-martial was recognized in official orders,37 
and it was held that "the accused is entitled to counsel as a right, 
and the court cannot properly deny him the assistance of a profes-
sional or other advisor."38 So it was further held that denial of 
counsel is a "fatal irregularity,"39 and the court is obliged to make 
an effort to provide counsel for the accused.40 The old rule was, 
however, that accused had no choice in the matter of defense coun-
sel, "and his wishes even are not to be consulted as to the individual 
who shall be designated to defend him,"41 but this rule was subse-
quently changed to conform to army practice.42 
With the advent of right to counsel in the naval service, it be-
came necessary to outline the duties of such counsel. One order 
declared: 
"An officer so detailed shall perform such duties as usually 
devolve upon counsel for defendant before civil courts in 
criminal cases. As such counsel he should guard the interests 
of the accused by all honorable means known to the law, so 
far as they are not inconsistent with military relations."43 
The above language, with the exception of the clause relating to 
military relations, was copied almost verbatim into the naval 
34 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY AND U.S.A.F., 1949, 1f'iT43, 45, pp. 40-43. 
35 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, 1[1[46, 48, pp. 66-71. 
36 LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1951, p. 28, 1[48. 
37 McCLELLAN, DIGEST OF DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY AND JUDGE 
ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE NAVY, 1862-1916 {NAVAL DIGEST) p. ll8, No. 19 (1916), C.M.O. 
49-1910, p. 14; C.M.O. 55-1910, p. 8. In LAUCHHEIMER, FORMS OF PROCEDURE (NAVY COURTS-
MARTIAL), 1896, the form at pp. 9-10 provides for the manner in which accused introduces 
his counsel. 
38 NAVAL DIGEST, p. 118, No. 6, C.M.O. 78-1905; C.M.O. 6-1909, p. 3. This is reprinted 
in NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, 1917, ,r265, P· 192, and in NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, 1937, 
§356, p. 200. 
39 NAVAL DIGEST, p. li9, No. 31, C.M.O. 49-1910, p. 14. 
401d. at 119, No. 22, C.M.O. 78-1905. 
41 Id. at 118, No. 14, July 7, 1913. 
42 NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, 1937, §§356, 358, pp. 200-201. 
43 NAVAL DIGEST, p. 117, No. 4, C.M.O. 75-1898; C.M.O. 78-1905, p. l; C.M.O. 55-1910, 
p.8. 
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court-martial manual.44 In addition, the 1937 edition contains 
extracts from the Canons of Ethics.45 Thus, prior to the Uniform 
Code, naval law too followed the general law in the determination 
of a defense counsel's duties toward the accused. Thus, the im-
position by law of service-wide uniformity followed service-wide 
uniformity in practice. 
II. UNDERTAKING THE DEFENSE 
A. Duty To Undertake Defense of Accused 
Canon 4: 
"A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner 
ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and 
should always exert his best efforts in his behalf." 
Canon 5: 
"It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of 
a person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion 
as to the guilt of the accused . ... " 
Upon receiving an assignment as defense counsel or assistant 
defense counsel before a court-martial, the military lawyer will 
receive, in effect, an assignment to defend the several accused who 
are brought before the court. An initial question presented is 
whether the attorney has to defend all of the accused he is assigned 
to represent or may decline to enter into a professional relation-
ship with such of them as he desires not to. represent. 
The general rule in civilian practice is that an attorney takes 
such cases as he pleases and may decline a retainer for any reason 
or none at all.46 To this rule the obligation to represent indigent 
defendants forms an exception,47 for the primary considerations of 
assuring every person accused of crime a full defense and of 
equitably distributing the burden of representing indigent de-
fendants among members of the bar take precedence over an 
attorney's individual desires as to whom he shall represent. 
In this respect, it would appear that the status of every de-
fendant before a court-martial, regardless of his actual financial 
44NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, 1917, 1[266, p. 192; NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, 1937, §357, 
p. 201. Substantially similar language is found in FORMS OF PROCEDURE FOR COURTS AND 
BOARDS IN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 1916, p. 17. 
45 NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, 1937, §360, p. 202. The Canons reprinted are nos. 3, 5, 6, 
8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 37, and 44. 
46 Canon 31, Canons of Professional Ethics, American Bar Association; DRINKER, 
LEGAL ETHICS 139 (1953). 
47Id. at 62. 
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status, is similar to that of an indigent defendant. While the 
Manual for Courts-Martial does not in haec verba require that a 
military attorney defend an accused, regardless of the attorney's 
personal wishes, it seems that this is the clear implication from its 
provisions. Thus, the Manual provides that "The accused shall 
have the right to be represented ... by military counsel of his own 
selection if reasonably available, or by the defense counsel duly 
appointed pursuant to Article 27. Should the accused have 
counsel of his own selection, the duly appointed defense counsel ... 
shall, if the accused so desires, act as his associate counsel."48 The 
Manual further provides for the detail of specific persons as ac-
cused's individual counsel by the convening authority,49 and de-
clares that "it is his duty to undertake the defense regardless of his 
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused."50 (Note here the 
change of the word "right" in Canon 5 to the word "duty.") 
In addition to these provisions in the Manual, there is some 
case law which indicates that a military attorney must accept all 
cases to which he is detailed. In Weintraub's Case,51 the Board of 
Review declared: 
"Accused in acting as Assistant Defense Counsel was un-
like a private attorney in that he was carrying out the orders 
of superior military authority. His duty with respect to that 
order, as with any lawful order, was to execute it as faithfully 
and efficiently as he could .... This duty was to be performed 
not for his own private advantage, financial or otherwise, but 
simply because he was an officer of the United States Army."52 
It would thus appear that absent statutory53 or other specific 
disqualification54 an order to a military attorney to act as counsel 
48 MANUAL FOR CoURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, 'if48a, p. 67. 
49 Id. at 'jf48b, p. 68. 
150 Id. at 'jf48c, p. 68. Cf. C.M. 243542, Blank, 28 B.R. 11 (1943), wherein accused was 
convicted of being drunk "while on duty" as a defense counsel before a special court-martial. 
51 C.M. 313891, Weintraub, 63 B.R. 317 (1946). 
152 Id. at p. 331. See also C.M. 343792, Krivoski, 12 J.C. 81, 93 (1950). And in HOUGH, 
PRECEDENTS IN MILITARY LAw, Case 2, pp. 272, 274 Guly 17, 1830) (1855), where a surgeon 
acted "as if he were a medical practitioner, quite free and independent • • • to attend a 
sick officer of his regiment or not, at his own discretion,'' it was held that "his position 
is quite different,'' and "that he had no more right" to refuse medical services "than he 
had to discharge any other point of duty." But see WINTHROP, DIGF.51' OPINIONS JAG 1862-
1868, 3d ed., 127, No. 4 (1868); HOWLAND, D1GFSI' OPINIONS JAG 1862-1912, p. 509, July 1874 
(1912). 
53 See, for example, U.C.M.J., art. 27 (a) and MANUAL FOR CoURTS•MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, 
,i6a, p. 9, and 'jf48b, p. 68. 
54 For example, the appointment of enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, or war-
rant officers as defense counsel has been held to be contrary to custom. Sp.C.M. 1770, Ness, 
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for an accused would be a lawful order"' with which the lawyer 
would be required to comply. 
This is not to say that a military attorney may not express his 
desire to be relieved from defending a particular accused. The 
Manual specifically requires the defense counsel to report to the 
convening authority any facts showing that he "is for any reason ... 
unable . . . to perform his duties in any case.''56 An unwilling 
attorney is often an ineffective advocate, and since the enumeration 
of the specific reasons for disqualification therein stated, ~.g., bias, 
prejudice, hostility toward the accused, are not intended to be all 
inclusive, it would appear that such a report could properly be 
made if for any reason the attorney desires to decline the accused's 
defense. 
Furthermore, defense counsel is required to disclose to the ac-
cused "any ground of possible disqualification, and any other 
matter which might influence the accused in the selection of 
counsel."67 This would certainly encompass his own desire to be 
excused from the case.58 The accused may then excuse the defense 
counsel from the case and request another (as he probably will), 
since he has the right to object to a defense counsel regardless of 
the merit of his objections.59 
The rule requiring defense counsel to take all cases is a salutary 
one. In civilian practice, a defendant is almost always able, if 
turned down by one attorney, to secure the services of another. 
However, with today's shortage of JAG officers, especially at 
6 J.C. 345 (1950) (CWO); United States v. Kolbert, (A.C.M.S. 1950) 3 (A.F.) C.M.R. 
326 (WO); United States v. Nichols, (A.C.M.S. 1950) 3 (A.F.) C.M.R. 462 (WO); United 
States v. Goodson, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 3 C.M.R. 32 (1952) (WO); United States v. Zilnick, 
(N.C.M. 1954) 14 C.M.R. 527 (WO); United States v. Long, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 572, 18 C.M.R. 
196 (1955) (NCO). But see HARWOOD, UNITED STATFS NAVAL COURTS-MARTIAL 174 (1867), 
referring to summary (now special) courts-martial: "The court, if requested by tbe ac-
cused, may allow a commissioned, warrant, or petty officer to appear as counsel." 
fifi The usual cliches on this subject are collected in AVINS, THE LAw OF AwoL 207 
et seq. (1957), and in Avins, "The Joker in Jester, The Parris Island Death March Case," 
53 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 33 at 35 (1958). 
56 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, 1[46b, p. 66. Final determination of dis-
qualification rests witb tbe attorney's superior, except insofar as tbe accused objects. Cf. 
E.T.O. 7270, McDonald, 18 E.T.O. 73 (1945). 
57 :MANUAL FOR CoURTS·MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, 1[48c, p. 68. 
58 le such desire stems from matter going to the merits of the case, tbe attorney would 
be required to reveal tbis to the accused under MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, 
,r48f, p. 69, providing, substantially as Canon 8 does, tbat "he is bound to give tbe accused 
his candid opinion of tbe merits of tbe case." 
59 C.M. 323234, Mead, 72 B.R. 165 at 172 (1947). Permitting an officer to serve as 
defense counsel over the accused's objections is reversible error regardless of his guilt or 
how well counsel conducted tbe case. C.M.O. 3-1931, p. 14. 
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isolated installations, 60 it would play havoc with the congressional 
scheme of providing every defendant with competent counsel to 
allow military attorneys to pick and choose cases at will. Hence, 
to assure that all defendants are adequately represented, the ap-
portionment of professional services must be left to the attorney's 
superior. This is not to say that such superior should, or even may, 
capriciously refuse the request of an attorney to be excused from a 
case if the needs of the accused can otherwise be satisfied. Indeed, 
such an attitude would probably violate the superior's duty of 
protection to the lawyer as well as the client.61 Legal representa-
tion is not a mere mechanical service which can be performed 
just as well regardless of the lawyer's personal feelings about the 
case. Whether to excuse an attorney from a case is a matter re-
quiring the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, similar to that 
exercised by a judge in excusing an attorney from representing an 
indigent defendant. Thus, the requirements of Canon 4 should 
be integrated into this branch of the relationship between a mili-
tary attorney and his client. 
B. Acceptance of Fees 
Canon 12: 
" ... A client's ability to pay ... may require a less charge, 
or even none at all . ... " 
- The general rule in civilian practice is that an attorney is per-
mitted to charge his client a reasonable fee for his services, 62 but 
cases of indigent defendants form an exception to this rule.63 
Here, again, the military justice system is geared to the defense of 
non-affluent defendants, who constitute the major portion of ac-
cused before courts-martial. In effect, defense counsel constitute 
a public defender system, and since they are paid by the govern-
ment for the services that they render to the accused, they are not 
permitted to charge the accused fees for these services and thus 
collect double compensation. One Board of Review has held: 
"Military counsel, in any event, from the nature of their office 
which precludes any financial gain for their defense of an accused 
60 See "Report of the Committee on the Status of the Lawyer in the Armed Services," 
23 J.A.G.J. 17 (1956); "Senator Thurmond Introduces ABA President at Hearings on In-
centive Pay Bill," 26 J.A.G.J. 5 (1958). 
61 See Avins, "The Joker in Jester, The Parris Island Death March Case," 53 N.W. 
UNIV. L. Riw. 33 at 41 (1958). 
62 DRINKER, LEGAL Ennes 170 (1953). 
63 Id. at 172, n. 30; 62, n. 13. 
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person, are free from imputations of disloyalty which may attach 
to counsel for hire in similar circumstances."64 
As early as World War I, it was held that naval officers may 
not receive fees as counsel before courts-martial.65 The receipt, 
or even solicitation, of such fees, was later held to constitute con-
duct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.66 
Undoubtedly, the leading case in this area is Weintraub's 
Case,61 in which the accused was tried and convicted under AW 95 
and AW 96 for asking for and receiving money from a defendant 
before a general court-martial for defending him, although he had 
been appointed as regular assistant defense counsel of the court.68 
This case is of particular interest because it constitutes the only 
reported military case wherein an attorney was court-martialed for 
professional misconduct before a military tribunal. 69 It might 
also be noted that it has been held in New York that similar activi-
ties constitute professional misconduct warranting disciplinary 
action.70 
The rule in Weintraub' s Case has been codified in the Manual 
for Courts-Martial, which now provides: "Military personnel on 
64 C.M. 343792, Krivoski, 12 J.C. 81 at 85 (1950). 
65 NAVAL DIGEST, p. 118, No. 17, Sec. Navy, Feb. 26, 1915; C.M.O. 10-1915, p. 13. See 
also 18 U.S.C. (1958) §281, forbidding government officers from receiving compensation for 
services rendered before courts-martial. 
66 C.M. 334866, Schultz, l J.C. 321 (1949), application for relief denied, Memo. Op. 
J.A.G.A. (1949-1950), p. 308 (1950). 
61 C.M. 313891, Weintraub, 63 B.R. 317 (1946). 
68 Id. at 332. "The military duty which he was required to perform was turned by 
him into an occasion of personal profit. His conduct was in every way comparable to 
that of a medical officer of the Army who conditioned his treatment of a soldier on the 
payment of a fee, and just as reprehensible. The fairness and efficiency of the court-martial 
system is dependent to a large extent on the competency and integrity of the counsel 
appointed to defend persons accused of violations of the Articles of War. While the latter 
have the right to retain military or civilian counsel (par. 45, MCM, 1928), in the great 
majority of cases the counsel appointed by the convening authority is the counsel whose 
services are utilized. Nothing could dissipate confidence in the impartiality of the system 
more than a belief among accused that the vigor of their defense was proportionate to 
the amount of money they could pay their counsel." 
69 See also HouGH, PRECEDENTS IN Mn.ITARY LAW, Case 2 Guly 17, 1830) (1855), wherein 
a surgeon was court-martialed for demanding a fee for professional services. 
70 See In re Dresnick, 2 App. Div. (2d) 521, 157 N.Y.S. (2d) 23 (1956). Frank H. 
Gordon, Chief Attorney, Committee on Grievances, Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, who handled Weintraub's subsequent disbarment, declared in a letter of 
August 1, 1958 to this author that the committee "did consider the court martial con-
viction in taking the action that we did, and we certainly considered that his conduct 
in the court martial case was professionally improper. Indeed, it is my view that such 
conduct would justify an order of disbarment provided it was proved in an appropriate 
hearing." Cited by him to this author as analogous was Matter of Greenberg, 267 App. Div. 
530, 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 249 (1944), and Matter of Popper, 193 App. Div. 505, 184 N.Y.S. 406 
(1920). 
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active duty or persons employed by the armed forces shall not 
solicit or accept fees of any kind from an accused as reimbursement 
for acting as his counsel before a court-martial or before any of the 
appellate agencies concerned with the administration of justice 
under the code."71 There has been only one reported case wherein 
this rule was violated since the uniform code went into effect.72 
III. DUTY OF ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION 
Canon 15: 
" ... The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the 
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights 
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,' to the 
end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by 
the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor 
or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full 
discharge of his duty . ... " 
The military attorney owes to his serviceman-client the duty of 
adequate representation.73 Thus, a number of specific duties are 
required of him by the Manual for Courts-Martial.74 These will 
not be taken up specifically, for they are clear and have rarely been 
the subject of litigation, even indirectly. It is sufficient to say that 
should any of these duties specifically enjoined be omitted, and 
should such omission materially and adversely affect the accused's 
rights in any way, such neglect would probably constitute inade-
quate representation per se,75 and might well be reversible error. 
A. The Plight of the Indignant Indigent 
"It has been said," a Judge Advocate General of the Army once 
remarked, "that it is a favorite game of those convicted of offenses 
to criticize their counsel. 'The opportunity to try his former 
lawyer has its undoubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner.' "76 
'11 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, ,r48a, p. 67. 
72United States v. White, (A.C.M. 1953) 7 C.M.R. 764. 
73 United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 552, 25 C.M.R. 56 (1957). 
74 MANUAL FOR CoURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, ,r46d, p. 66; ,r48 (d-j), PP· 69-71. 
75 See C.M. 323234, Mead, 72 B.R. 165 at 171 (1947), where the regularly appointed 
defense counsel was criticized for failing to assist accused in getting civilian individual 
counsel, as required by the Manual, although accused, by reason of his confinement, 
required such assistance. 
76 C.M. 282005, Wincelowicz, Memo. Op. J.A.G.A. (1949-1950), p. 232 (1950). This 
author once received a request for representation in which letter the military prisoner 
declared that the brief of army appellate defense counsel before the Court of Military 
Appeals was "not worth its weight in Apache currency." 
1960] MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL 359 
This observation is particularly apposite in our system of military 
justice, where, because most counsel are appointed for the accused, 
failure of counsel to represent an accused adequately constitutes a 
denial of military due process and is reversible error.77 Hence, 
when an accused runs short of other reversible errors, he is apt to 
rely on his counsel's alleged shortcomings for his appeal.78 This 
incentive to try one's former counsel has not escaped the attention 
of the appellate military tribunals, and they are loathe to allow 
appellate counsel to re-fight lost battles on appellate fields.79 
Appellate military tribunals have firmly adhered to the rule 
that mere differences of opinion as to trial tactics or allegations of 
errors by counsel induced by hindsight do not amount to inade-
quate representation.80 The defense counsel is presumed to have 
performed his duty, 81 and the burden on accused of showing the 
contrary is not sustained by "the mere fact that his present counsel, 
upon an analysis in retrospect of the cold record, believes he would 
either have asked or refrained from asking some question, or would 
have made some objection differently.''82 To show reversible error, 
the accused must demonstrate "that the alleged errors on the part 
of the defense counsel reduced the latter's 'batting average' 'so low' 
as to make his representation ineffective, "83 and this may not be 
77 Hiatt v. Brown, (5th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 273, revd. on other grounds 339 U.S. 
103 (1950). See AYCOCK AND WURFEL, MILITARY JumCE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF 
MILITARY JumCE 133, 193 (1955). Cf. United States v. Smith, IO U.S.C.M.A. 31, 27 C.M.R. 
105 (1958). 
78 In United States v. Bigger, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 8 C.M.R. 97 (1953), Judge Latimer 
said at p. 101: "It is not unusual for losing litigants to lay the blame for their conviction 
on the doorstep of those who represent them and this case varies little from the usual 
pattern. The charges are sweeping, but there is no evidence to sustain them." 
79See United States v. Soukup, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 141, 7 C.M.R. 17 (1953) at p. 20. 
so United States v. Hopwood, (A.C.M. 1957), 23 C.M.R. 937; United States v. Bigger, 
2 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 8 C.M.R. 97 (1953). In United States v. Day, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 416, 9 C.M.R. 
46 (1953) at p. 57, Judge Latimer held that an accused is not denied the effective assistance 
of counsel "merely because appellate counsel could suggest different trial tactics than 
those used by trial counsel." Likewise, in C.M. 337951, Lawrence, 5 J.C. 397 (1950), at 
p. 420, it was held: "The fact that counsel on appeal do not agree with the tactics 
employed at the trial affords no ground for invalidating the proceedings." And in C.M. 
307465, Danker, Memo. Op. J.A.G.A. (1949-1950), p. 184 (1950) at p. 189, the Judge 
Advocate General held: "The fact that later counsel, with the benefit of the entire written 
record before him, might discover some points upon which his defense would differ from 
that of counsel at the trial, does not necessarily indicate that trial counsel's methods are 
to be criticized." Cf. C.M.O. 4-1937, p. 16, holding that accused's testimony may not be 
stricken merely because his new counsel thinks that his former counsel employed bad 
strategy in putting accused on the stand. 
81 C.M.O. 9-1936, p. 24. 
82 Ex parte Steele, (M.D. Pa. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 428 at 431. 
83 United States v. Nicholson, (A.C.M. 1952) 4 C.M.R. 519 at 531. And in C.M. 296129, 
Stevenson, Memo. Op. J.A.G.A. (1949-1950), p. 408 (1950) at p. 411, the Judge Advocate 
General declared that an accused "is entitled only to a fair trial and not to a perfect trial." 
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done by charting a new route for counsel below which shows how 
pitfalls could have been avoided, obstacles overcome, and the ac-
cused extricated from his predicament. 
It would appear that the error which will overthrow a convic-
tion must be different in kind, rather than degree, from those 
which all counsel are wont to make on trial. The appellate military 
tribunals adhere to what may be termed the "shocking error" 
rule.84 While counsel must endeavor to keep the accused's defense 
as watertight as possible, he cannot be condemned for not doing a 
perfect job. Only when counsel has committed a gross error has the 
accused been inadequately represented. A federal district court 
has observed: 
"Nor does the Constitution guarantee the assistance of the 
most brilliant counsel. To entitle petitioner to relief on this 
ground there must be such a neglect of duty ' ... as to make the 
trial itself "offend those canons of decency" which constitute 
due process of law,' or an extreme case which would make 
the proceedings 'a farce and a mockery of justice.' "85 
In spite of the above admonitions to appellate counsel, military 
appellate tribunals do from time to time reverse cases because of 
the unskillfulness of trial counsel below, following the old and 
oft-quoted statement of the Acting Judge Advocate General in 
Osman's Case86 that "the rule of the courts of common law, both 
civil and criminal, that a party has no relief against errors, omis-
sions, or poor judgment of his counsel, can have but a limited 
application in court-martial practice, where the majority of counsel 
are not learned in the law, and where it is the duty of everyone 
connected with the administration of military justice, and not least 
my own, to see that the rights of every accused are adequately 
protected."87 Since, therefore, failure of trial counsel to represent 
an accused adequately is reversible error on appeal, it becomes the 
duty of defense counsel to his serviceman-client on appeal to urge 
this point as error in proper cases, and failure to urge this where 
84In United States v. Hunter, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 37, 6 C.M.R. 37 (1952), the court, at p. 
41, held: "After appointment of counsel, as required by the Code, an accused, if he con-
tends his rights have not been fully protected, must reasonably show that the proceedings 
'by which he was convicted were so erroneous as to constitute a ridiculous and empty 
,gesture, or were so tainted with negligence or wrongful motives on the part of his counsel 
as to manifest a complete absence of judicial character •.•. Many records reflect examples 
-of doubtful trial tactics but counsel cannot be censored for not adopting the best." 
85 Ex parte Smith, (M.D. Pa. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 935 at 939-940. 
86 C.M. 200989, Osman, 5 B.R. 11 (1933). 
87 Id. at 39. See also C.M. 210404, Cameron, 9 B.R. 265 at 270 (1938). 
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warranted would constitute inadequate representation of the ac-
cused on appeal. The question then becomes, in what types of cases 
is giving vent to the indignant feelings of the client warranted? 
B. The Self-Appointed Prosecutor 
Canon 15: 
" ... In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit 
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the 
law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every 
such remedy or defense . ... " 
Probably the oldest and best-settled type of inadequate repre-
sentation which can be rendered by defense counsel is that per-
formed by the self-appointed prosecutor. The earliest cases of this 
kind which are reported are a line of naval cases, in which the 
prosecution rested without having introduced any evidence or 
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case, and in which, 
therefore, a defense motion to dismiss the case would have to have 
been granted at the close of the prosecution's case. At that point, 
however, the defense counsel, instead of making such motion, pro-
ceeded to put the accused 88 or another witness89 on the stand, and 
elicit from such witness or the accused enough testimony to make 
out a prima fade case for the prosecution. Indeed, in several of 
these cases, conviction rested upon the accused's judicial admissions 
alone.90 
Cases of the above type have been consistently reversed. Label-
ing this manner of establishing a prima facie case "very irregular," 
an early case declared that it "points towards a careless performance 
of duty on the part of ... the counsel for the accused."91 A later 
case warned that "at no time should the counsel for the accused 
attempt to establish elements of the offense which the prosecution 
is required to prove in order to support its case,"92 for, as another 
88 C.M.O. 1-1931, p. 31; C.M.O. 7-1931, p. 18; C.M.O. 1-1932, p. 12; C.M.O. 1-1942, p. 
157; C.M.O. 1-1944, p. 52; C.M.O. 3-1944, p. 432. 
89 C.M.O. 12-1922, p. 7. See also Letter of Gen. S. T. Ansell to Senator Chamberlain, 
66th Cong., 1st sess., 58 CoNG. REc. 3943 (1919): "A second lieutenant as counsel made no 
effort to assist. That they were hindered rather than helped in their defense by counsel 
is demonstrated by the fact that in the case where a plea of guilty was entered the sole 
effort of counsel consisted of his calling a witness and asking him this question: 'Q. Was 
the accused's record good up to this time?-A. It was not. It was one of the worst in the 
company.'" 
90 C.M.O. 1-1931, p. 31; C.M.O. 7-1931, p. 18; C.M.O. 1-1942, p. 157. 
91 C.M.O. 12-1922, p. 7. 
92 C.M.O. 1-1932, p. 12. 
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case noted, this would result "in the accused being deprived of 
the defense he was entitled to have and, in effect, being opposed 
by two prosecutors."93 The Judge Advocate General of the Navy 
has held: 
"Counsel, by attempting to prove as facts allegations of the 
specification which it was the recorder's duty to prove, failed 
in his duty to protect the accused's interests. If the procedure 
followed in this case were allowed to pass unnoticed it would 
tend to destroy the confidence which an enlisted man should 
feel in the competency of an officer to represent him as counsel 
before a court-martial."94 
A closing statement by defense counsel containing similar error 
was handled in a like manner.96 
The first army case of this kind is not in reality a self-appointed 
prosecutor case, but rather a court-appointed prosecutor case, for 
counsel, representing four co-defendants, was forced to abandon 
the interests of one to save the other three. The Board of Review, 
however, in reversing the conviction of the defendant whose inter-
ests were sacrificed, properly treated the situation as similar to 
those noted above. It declared: 
"It is thus clear that the defense counsel was nothing other 
than a self-imposed prosecutor as far as the rights and privi-
leges of accused Kozo were concerned and that the latter was 
deprived of counsel. ... Obviously it would be prejudicial 
error to try an accused under military law without a defense 
counsel; hence, all the more reason for error when it is clearly 
shown that the appointed defense counsel acted as a prosecu-
tor in fact. Failure on the part of the court to grant a sever-
ance, when it became apparent that the defense counsel 
planned to convict Kozo in order to acquit the other accused, 
resulted in fatal error."96 
In the next case, however, counsel's "helpfulness" was purely 
of his own making. In Gardner's Case,91 the accused was charged 
with desertion, which was terminated by apprehension. After 
proving only the initiation and termination of the AWOL, the 
prosecution rested, whereupon defense counsel pointed out that 
the prosecutioh had failed to prove that the accused was appre-
9s C.M.O. 1-1944, p. 52. See also C.M.O. 3-1944, p. 432. 
94 C.M.O. 1-1931, p. 31. 
95 C.M.O. 8-1921, p. IO (a hair-raising case). 
96 C.M. 194997, Elberson, 2 B.R. 173 at 178 (1931). To the same effect, see United 
States v. Pawlik, (C.M. 1951) 2 C.M.R. 248. 
97 C.M. 320618, Gardner, 70 B.R. 71 (1947). 
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hended. He offered to stipulate that the facts contained in the 
delinquency report were true, although it contained not only a 
report of apprehension but also the other incriminating facts that 
accused had committed other crimes, had held a civilian job, and 
used an alias. The stipulation was agreed to between the prose-
cution and defense. The report would have been inadmissible in 
the absence of stipulation, and the facts therein could probably 
not have otherwise been proved. The Board held that this per-
formance constituted reversible error.98 
The Board further held that although the evidence of desertion 
was strong, it was not conclusive, and defense counsel's conduct 
in introducing otherwise incompetent incriminating evidence shut 
the door on any possibility of a finding of the lesser included 
offense of AWOL, and thus directly aided the prosecution. Find-
ing no excuse for this action, it characterized counsel's conduct 
as bordering on a "lack of good faith." It further stated: 
"It can not be implied from the foregoing authorities that 
a conviction should be set aside in every case where the record 
discloses mistakes or lack of skill on the part of the defense 
counsel. ... But where the disloyalty or gross carelessness of 
defense counsel directly aids the prosecution, the conviction 
should be set aside. "99 
Another example of a "well intentioned act ... incompatible 
with [ defense counsel's] duty to protect the accused"100 by assisting 
the prosecution "in curing an oversight" is found in a pre-code 
case wherein the prosecution, after a finding of guilty, offered 
evidence of only four previous convictions. The defense counsel 
volunteered that he thought "the prosecution intended to submit 
evidence of five previous convictions," whereupon the court or-
dered the trial judge advocate to add the fifth conviction, and gave 
the accused a stiffer penalty based thereon. The Board found no 
difficulty in reducing the penalty and holding that counsel had 
failed in his duty. The advent of the uniform code has not com-
pletely done away with this. In United States v. Boese,101 after 
the trial counsel announced that there was no evidence of previous 
convictions, defense counsel suggested that records on previous 
98 The Board, in a very considerable understatement, noted, "It is apparent that there 
was nothing in the Report of Arrest which could possibly be considered as beneficial to 
the accused in any way." Id. at 74. 
99Id. at 78. This was quoted with approval in C.M. 341604, Tilley, 7 J.C. 171 at 181 
(1950). 
100 C.M. 328104, Best, 76 B.R. 281 at 283 (1948). 
lQl (A.C.M.S. 1952) 6 C.M.R. 608. 
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convictions should be checked. The court had this done and 
awarded a bad conduct discharge based on the two convictions 
thereby unearthed. The fruits of this search, too, were held to be 
not properly before the court, and the discharge was set aside. 
The doctrine of the self-appointed prosecutor cases applies also 
to a special situation where the defense counsel is actually trying 
to defend the accused by proving the commission of the offense. 
In such a case, the appellate military tribunal will search the 
record to determine that such a plan remained within the bounds 
of plausible trial tactics and did not unjustifiably risk the accused's 
position. A good example of such unwarranted risk is United 
States v. Fenoff.102 In this case, on the basis of a misapprehension 
as to the effect of an Executive Order on the statute of limitations, 
the inexperienced defense counsel (not a lawyer) attempted to 
prove the date of the accused's AWOL to sustain a plea in bar. His 
overzealous action, while the law member neglected to rule on the 
point, resulted in his presentation of evidence of the accused's 
commission of AWOL, "thereby gratuitously becoming the ac-
cused's prosecutor,"103 and for this the case was reversed. 
C. Prejudicial Admissions 
A second category of cases in which representation is held to 
be inadequate is that wherein the defense unjustifiably makes 
prejudicial admissions. 
The earliest prejudicial admission case is also a naval one, in 
which a judgment was held to be void because of extensive and 
material admissions made by defense counsel which constituted a 
confession of the facts of the case equivalent to a plea of guilty.104 
But in one of the first army cases reported, the fact of the "rejec-
tion by defense counsel of accused's explanation on the witness 
stand to the effect that he went absent without leave in order to 
avoid transfer to Fort Kamehameha, by saying in his closing argu-
ment 'Sanderson got scared and went absent,' thus in effect sug-
gesting that he went away because of a guilty conscience" was 
102 (A.C.M. 1950) 2 (A.F.) C.M.R. 574. 
10s Id. at 580. See also C.M.O. 1-1932, p. 12; United States v. Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 
48, 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958). 
104 C.M.O. 30-1918, p. 17. See also C.M. 332704, Bilbo, 81 B.R. 185 at 190 (1948), 
where "the only competent evidence adduced during the trial showing accused's initial 
absence without leave was through admissions of his defense counsel." But cf. C.M.O. 
8-1929, p. 8, holding that immaterial admissions by counsel subsequently confirmed in 
accused's testimony did not invalidate the proceedings. 
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merely termed a "noteworthy irregularity" which had to be con-
sidered with other similar defects and a weak case against the 
accused to justify reversal.105 
The first well-known prejudicial admission situation is found 
in Howard's Case,1°6 in which the accused was charged with 
murder. During the course of the trial, counsel moved to stop the 
trial on the grounds that the defendant was mentally incapable of 
assisting in his own defense. To support this assertion, counsel 
made an argument to the court which included the statement that 
"He told me two or three stories, none of which agree with one 
another. I can't even say that they are plausible." In predicating 
a reversal on this ill-advised advocacy, the Board of Review held: 
"It is difficult to conceive of anything more nearly fatal to 
the rights of an accused than for the court to hear from his 
defense counsel, who has received the confidences of accused, 
a statement to the effect that he had no plausible or consistent 
defense. This was little short of pleading guilty to a capital 
charge over the protests of the accused he was appointed to 
represent, who had previously entered a plea of not guilty."107 
The tendency of this statement to undermine the entire de-
fense of the accused was also noted by the Board, for it declared that 
although the evidence of murder was strong, accused might have 
explained it had he testified. However, he remained silent after 
these remarks, a fact which the Board attributed to the above 
statement. Thus the Board concluded: 
"Here, while accused was given the opportunity to testify, 
his counsel had already 'put two strikes against him' and 
virtually admitted to the court that accused had no plausible 
defense. This error on counsel's part is so grave that it stains 
the entire record and trial and it cannot be wiped out by a 
mere weighing of the evidence admitted."108 
The rationale of Howard's Case has been followed in more 
recent cases decided under the code. Thus, where counsel con-
ceded knowledge of a regulation although the accused had pleaded 
not guilty to a charge of failure to obey it and testified in support 
of such plea, the Court of Military Appeals reversed the convic-
1011 C.M. 194200, Sanderson, 2 B.R. 125 (1931). 
106 E.T.O. 13222, Howard, 26 E.T.O. 197 (1945), approved, E.T.O. 18250, Spain, 33 
E.T.O. 305 (1946). 
107 Howard, id. at 203. 
10s Id. at 205. 
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tion.109 Likewise, a statement by defense counsel that accused 
should be given a bad conduct discharge because he needed more 
money than he was getting from the service and hence would steal 
again was held to be reversible error.11° And the Court of Military 
Appeals has also held that after civilian counsel conducts a vigor~ 
ous defense on the merits, a gratuitous concession of guilt, although 
coupled with a plea for clemency, by the defense counsel is error 
prejudicial to the accused's rights.111 In all of these cases, the 
statement of defense counsel tended to undermine the accused's 
position, and hence was inconsistent in fact with counsel's duty of 
adequate representation. 
However, the statement complained of must be actually, and 
not just possibly, inconsistent with advocacy of the accused's over-
all position. Like any good strategist, defense counsel may give 
ground in particular sectors to advance the accused's cause as a 
whole. Counsel's battle plans must be looked at in their entirety. 
What may look like an unjustified retreat in isolation may in fact 
be a soundly planned strategic withdrawal from an untenable 
position. 
Because of the above considerations, there is an exception to 
the prejudicial admissions rule, that counsel may admit damaging 
material where the totality of the effect is not harmful to the ac-
cused's case taken as a whole. For example, in United States v. 
Gagnon,112 defense counsel admitted that accused was drunk, one 
of the offenses charged. However, his line of attack was to use the 
accused's condition to refute the much more serious charge of 
disrespect to a superior officer. In addition, drunkenness was not 
refuted, and even the accused himself admitted heavy drinking. 
The Board of Review held that the risk taken was not inconsistent 
with effective advocacy of accused's position. A like result was 
reached where counsel made an attempt, apparently successful, to 
get a short term of confinement for the accused by picturing him 
as a weak character.113 
Counsel is also permitted to make admissions where a denial 
would be in reality wholly untenable. In thus conceding what 
cannot fairly be denied, he establishes his candor before the court, 
109 United States v. Smith, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 582, 25 C.M.R. 86 (1958). 
110United States v. Lam, (A.C.M.S. 1954) 17 C.M.R. 697. 
111 United States v. Walker, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 355, 12 C.M.R. 111 (1953). 
112 (A.C.M.S. 1952) 6 C.M.R. 778. 
113 United States v. Malanaply, (A.C.M.S. 1953) 10 C.M.R. 883. Cf. United States v. 
Harrison, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 731, 26 C.M.R. 511 (1958). 
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upon which he may then press his really meritorious points. Thus, 
for example, in one case the defense counsel aggressively and 
impressively presented the accused's case and, after findings of 
guilty, also presented mitigating circumstances. It was urged as 
error that in the course of the latter presentation he stated that the 
accused should be punished for his offenses, but the representation 
was nevertheless held adequate.114 Likewise, where proof of guilt 
was overwhelming, it was held not improper for the defense 
counsel, in his closing statement, to concede this and plead for 
mercy.1111 In both of these cases, had counsel done the vain act 
of denying the obvious, it could not only not have aided the ac-
cused, but also it might have cast doubt on the meritorious aspects 
of accused's case. By conceding what was already clear, counsel 
was enabled to focus attention on his really tenable contentions. 
Such action is permissible. 
Finally in two cases, where admissions were made whose 
damaging effect was problematical, Boards of Review applied the 
presumption of regularity and the lack of traceable prejudicial 
effect to find that no error was committed.116 It thus appears that 
the making of damaging admissions constitutes inadequate rep-
resentation per se unless their helpful effect or at least lack of 
harmful effect can be reasonably demonstrated. 
D. Excessive Stipulations and Inadequate Objections 
Canon 5: 
" ... Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound, 
by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that 
the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be 
deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law . ... " 
Another category of cases in which inadequate representation 
is often found is that in which the defense counsel has entered into 
an excessive number of stipulations or failed to make objection to 
the introduction of objectionable evidence. Often, these defects 
go hand in hand in the same case, and they tend to deprive the ac-
cused of the effective assertion of all of his defenses. 
"Defense counsel," one Board of Review has pointed out, 
"should take care that he does not stipulate his client out of the 
114 United States v. Cupp, (A.C.M. 1957) 24 C.M.R. 565. 
115 United States v. Otero, (A.C.M. 1953) 8 C.M.R. 795. 
116 United States v. Patrick, (C.l\f. 1952) 7 C.M.R. 278; United States v. McCune, 
(A.C.M. 1955) 18 C.M.R. 798. 
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service with a bad conduct discharge or into confinement."117 
Thus, the making of improvident stipulations118 and a failure to 
withdraw a stipulation as to an essential element of an offense al-
though accused denied the facts therein in his testimony,119 along 
with other evidence of inadequate representation, has been held 
to be grounds for reversal. 
A good example of excessive stipulation is contained in United 
States v. Branigan.120 In this trial for missing movement, the 
prosecution introduced purported depositions of two enlisted men 
concerning knowledge of the estimated sailing time of the ac-
cused's vessel. Both depositions were unsigned, not under oath, 
and otherwise so lacking in official character as to amount to 
"merely unsigned pieces of paper." However, not only did 
defense counsel fail to object to the admission of these pseudo-
depositions, he apparently stipulated that had the alleged de-
ponents been present in court they would have testified substan-
tially as these documents set forth. In the same case defense 
counsel not only failed to object to a Duty Schedule on hearsay 
grounds, but also stipulated this in. Thus, all the evidence on this 
charge was either adduced or stipulated by the defense. In revers-
ing as to this part, the Board declared: 
"Military defense counsel who fails to exert every lawful 
effort in furtherance of his client's rights and privileges, 
technical or otherwise, is himself flaunting the will of Con-
gress and the order of his Commander-in-Chief. . . . In the 
instant case, military defense counsel handled his client's in-
terests badly."121 
Likewise, failure to make proper and timely objections has 
been held by several army cases to show inadequate representa-
tion.122 Thus, when counsel failed to object to incompetent 
evidence,123 or failed to object to an inadmissible confession,124 or 
did not persist in a valid objection and obtain a ruling from the 
117 United States v. Branigan, (C.G.C.M.S. 1952) 3 C.M.R. 515 at 518. 
118 E.T.O. 4756, Carmisciano, 13 E.T.O. 263 (1945). 
119 E.T.O. 4564, Woods, 13 E.T.O. 37 (1945). 
120 United States v. Branigan, (C.G.C.M.S. 1952) 3 C.M.R. 515. 
121 Id. at p. 519. But see United States v. Colbert, (A.C.M. 1951) I C.M.R. 811, where 
it was held that entering into stipulations does not constitute inadequate representation 
when the matters are easy to prove and when an intelligent accused (a sergeant) consents. 
122 C.M. 325107, Shatzer, 74 B.R. 83 (1947). 
123 C.M. 332704, Bilbo, 81 B.R.. 185 (1948); E.T.O. 4756, Carmisciano, 13 E.T.O. 263 
(1945). 
124 C.M. 317691, Plummer, 67 B.R.. 41 (1946). 
1960] MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL 369 
law member,125 he "failed in his duty of protecting the accused 
from the admission of incompetent evidence against him."126 So 
also a naval case determined that where counsel for the accused 
failed to exclude a considerable volume of hearsay, biased opinions 
of obviously prejudiced witnesses, and evidence of circumstances 
of doubtful relevance, the conviction would be reversed and a new 
trial ordered although there was sufficient evidence in the record 
to sustain the findings.127 A federal court has also concurred in 
the view that a repeated and unjustified failure to take timely 
objections tends to show that defense counsel is "ineffective" and 
"inept," and hence has failed in his duty to represent the accused 
adequately.128 
In addition to a failure to object to evidence adduced by the 
prosecution, representation may be inadequate for failure to pro-
tect the accused from convicting himself.129 Thus, in a World 
War II case from the China Theater of Operations, the accused, al-
though not on the stand, was examined by the law member and 
forced to give evidence against himself, an interrogation invited 
by the defense counsel. The Assistant Judge Advocate General, 
in holding that the privilege of self-incrimination was not waived, 
declared: 
"The fact that defense counsel joined in the proceedings 
and helped to develop this inadmissible testimony only furth-
er serves to show the lack of proper defense. It has been held 
more than once that accused will not be made to suffer for the 
incompetence and unskillfulness of defense counsel.''130 
So important have military courts considered the making of 
proper objections in the effective representation of the accused 
that they frown upon having defense counsel used as a witness for 
125 C.M. 200989, Osman, 5 B.R. 11 (1933). 
126 Id. at 39. 
127 C.M.O. 2-1939, p. 205. See also C.M.O. 5-1949, p. llO: "On cross-examination the 
accused was asked approximately 27 questions which could have been challenged as either 
double, harassing and difficult to understand, or repetitious and argumentative. No ob• 
jection whatsoever was taken, and there is no explanation in the record of counsel's failure 
to protect the accused." 
128 Hayes v. Hunter, (D.C. Kan. 1948) 83 F. Supp. 940. But see ex parte Smith, (M.D. 
Pa. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 935. 
129 See C.M.O. 3-1944, p. 432. And in United States v. Branigan, (C.G.C.M.S. 1952) 
3 C.M.R. 515, the Board said at p. 519: "Prior to this, defense counsel had set the stage 
for the Court's examination by his examination of accused on matters which he argued 
bore on the intent required to be shown. The irony of this becomes more apparent when 
it is recognized that defense counsel opened this door over vigorous objection of trial 
counsel that the line of examination had no bearing on the elements of the offense." 
130 C.M. I.B.T. 622 (C.T. 37) Shim, 3 C.B.1.-1.B.T. Ill (1945) at 131. 
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the prosecution even in formal matters where no question of 
attorney-client privilege is involved.131 The principal reason for 
this is that the lawyer's testimony could be objectionable, _and yet 
counsel, being on the stand, might be precluded from properly 
safeguarding accused's rights.132 An excellent illustration of this 
danger is contained in an old naval case wherein the only evidence 
against the accused was that given by his counsel as a witness for 
the prosecution in response to two leading questions asked by the 
judge advocate which amounted to nothing more than his telling 
the witness what to say concerning the same conclusion of fact 
contained in the specification. It was held that the duty of ade-
quate representation had not been discharged, as counsel had 
failed to exclude his own objectionable testimony.133 Thus, a 
finding that accused was not adequately represented may be based 
on unjustified failure to object to incompetent evidence or enter-
ing into unwarranted stipulations. 
E. Cumulative Ineptness 
Aside from the above specific actions which demonstrate that 
the representation below was inadequate, military appellate tri-
bunals, in testing for inadequacy of representation, appear to 
follow the rule of cumulative ineptness or ineffectiveness. Thus, 
although one slip is not generally enough to show inadequacy, a 
number of them, added together, may be sufficient to require 
reversal. 
Some slips are such egregious errors as to make the entire 
performance of counsel suspect. Thus, where counsel entered a 
plea of guilty to AWOL on accused's behalf and in the very next 
breath moved for a continuance on the ground that accused was 
not in fact absent without leave during the period charged to 
which he had just pleaded the accused guilty, it was held that 
"this demonstration of inaptness and disregard for detail related 
directly to the substantive issues before the court for adjudication 
and at the outset manifestly denied to the accused his right to a 
fair and intelligent presentation of his defense."134 A similar 
conclusion was reached where counsel allowed the accused to plead 
not guilty to a specification and yet guilty to the charge of the 
131 United States v. Thomas, (A.C.M.S. 1954) 18 C.M.R. 610. 
132 C.M.O. 3-1943, p. 22. 
133 C.M.O. 12-1923, p. 6. 
134 C.M. 332704, Bilbo, 81 B.R. 185 (1948). 
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same offense.135 And where the non-lawyer defense counsel ob-
jected to trial counsel's reading a definition from Black's Law 
Dictionary on the ground that trial counsel was not a lawyer "in 
the sense of Article 27, and in my opinion he cannot quote law," 
this indicated a complete lack of familiarity with court-martial 
procedure and tended to show a lack of effective representation.136 
Aside from such patent errors, an appellate tribunal will con-
sider the whole record made below to determine whether repre-
sentation, taken as a whole, is inadequate. In such a search, there 
are a number of factors which will weigh in the balance. 
For example, lack of preparation of the case will be considered 
as an indicia of the failure of counsel to perform his duty toward 
the accused.137 Thus, in United States v. McFarlane,138 Chief 
Judge Quinn, concurring in a reversal, noted that "defense counsel 
here conceded everything, explored nothing, was unprepared on 
every issue, and made the least of what he had."139 
Failure to challenge a member of the court who is subject to 
challenge, when sound trial tactics would indicate doing so, is 
evidence of deficient representation.140 Thus, failure to examine 
members of a court specially appointed for the case on voir dire was 
criticized where there were areas worth probing.141 
Probably the most popular ground for urging on appeal that 
representation below was inadequate is alleged deficiencies in 
cross-examination, and it is probably the least persuasive, for 
nothing is more likely to create differences of opinion among even 
experienced trial lawyers in the same case as when, where, and 
how to cross-examine. Thus, while a patently unjustified failure 
135 C.l\f. 315877, Ellis, 65 B.R. 151 (1946). See also Letter of Gen. S. T. Ansell to 
Senator Chamberlain, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 58 CoNG. REc. 3944 (1919): "This accused 
was also defended by worse than no counsel. ..• [H]e pleaded 'to the specification, not 
guilty; to the charge, guilty.' " And see p. 3943, where accused pleaded guilty and then 
made a statement completely inconsistent with his plea, but counsel failed to move to 
have his plea changed. It was held, "This is an excellent example of a meaningless trial. 
The accused had no counsel worthy of the name.'' 
136 United States v. Wallace, (A.C.M.S. 1953) 10 C.M.R. 937. 
137 Hiatt v. Brown, (5th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 273, revd. on other grounds 339 U.S. 
103 (1950); Sp.C.M. 716, Aaron, 4 J.C. 461 at 463 (1949); United States v. Wallace, 
(A.C.M.S. 1953) IO C.M.R. 937; United States v. Parker, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 75, 19 C.M.R. 201 
(1955). But see United States v Wilson, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 248, 8 C.M.R. 48 (1953), holding 
that the mere fact that counsel consulted with the accused only once prior to trial for ten 
minutes did not show inadequate representation as accused may be able to contribute little 
and counsel may have otherwise prepared the case. 
138 8 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 23 C.M.R. 320 (1957). 
139 Id. at 324. 
140 C.M.O. 5-1949, P· no. 
141 United States v. Parker, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 75, 19 C.M.R. 201 (1955). 
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to cross-examine will subject counsel to criticism,142 appellate 
courts are slow to referee this aspect of trial tactics and require a 
very strong showing indeed before they will hold that counsel was 
deficient in this respect.143 Appellate courts are not insensible to 
the fact that there are many quite hostile witnesses whom it is better 
not to cross-examine at all and others against whom only limited 
cross-examination will be fruitful.144 Nothing could be more 
erroneous than to think that the effectiveness of counsel is directly 
proportional to the number of questions he asks,14G and hence an 
allegation of error based on failure to cross-examine is likely to 
succeed only in extreme cases. 
While appellate counsel is unlikely to get much mileage out of 
. an attack on the adequacy of cross-examination below, he will 
generally fare much better upon a showing that the trial attorney 
failed to present a defense which the accused had, or neglected to 
offer available matter in mitigation, for it seems that appellate 
military courts are quite receptive to this type of argument.146 
Thus, where accused was tried for desertion, counsel not only 
failed on direct examination of the accused to rebut an inference of 
intent to desert, but after a vigorous cross-examination failed to 
conduct a redirect examination to clarify the confused picture 
then existing. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy, in 
ordering a new trial for this and other errors, declared that "it is 
the duty of the naval counsel to present to the court every lawful 
defense available to the accused ... [ and here it] is clear that counsel 
did not appreciate his duties, and ... there is a grievous departure 
142 United States v. Wallace, (A.C.M.S. 1953) 10 C.M.R. 937; C.M. 194200, Sanderson, 
2 B.R. 125 (1931) ("failure of counsel to cross-examine this sole prosecution witness on the 
vital matter of identification as to which the proof was not satisfactory"). 
143 United States v. Nelson, (A.C.MS. 1953) 9 C.M.R. 736; Ex parte Smith, (M.D. Pa. 
1947) 72 F. Supp. 935. 
144 See: Von Moschzisker, "Some Maxims for Cross-Examination," 3 PRAcnCAL LAW-
YER 78 (Dec. 1957); Popham, "The Art of Cross-Examination and Trial Strategy," 22 
UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REv. 217 (1954); Stryker, "Cross-Examination," 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 45 
(1952); McCormick, "Scope and Art of Cross-Examination," 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 177 
(1952). 
145 United States v. Soukup, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 141, 7 C.M.R. 17 (1953). 
146 Hiatt v. Brown, (5th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 273 (token defense); E.T.O. 4564, 
Woods, 13 E.T.O. 37 (1945) (no defense or mitigation); United States v. Parker, 6 
U.S.C.M.A. 75, 19 C.M.R. 201 (1955) (no defense on merits or as to involuntary nature of 
confession and no attempt to avoid death penalty); United States v. McFarlane, 8 US.C.M.A. 
96, 23 C.M.R. 320 (1957) (no defense, little mitigation); United States v. Allen, 8 US.C.M.A. 
504, 25 C.M.R. 8 (1957) (no mitigation); United States v. Armeli, 8 US.C.M.A. 513, 25 
C.M.R. 17 (1957) (same); United States v. Home, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 26 C.M.R. 381 (1958) 
(defense not presented). But see United States v. Friborg, 8 US.C.M.A. 515, 25 C.M.R. 19 
(1957) (representation adequate); United States v. Beddingfield, (A.C.M. 1956) 22 C.M.R. 
840 (defense not sustained by the facts); United States v. McMahan, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 709, 
21 C.M.R. 31 (1956) (no mitigation). 
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from the standards required of counsel to the manifest detriment 
of the accused."147 Likewise, failure of defense counsel to in-
troduce corroborative evidence of alibi, which accused informed 
him was available, and which would have constituted a complete 
defense, in one case,148 and failure to make any effort to procure 
the testimony of the only defense witness, or to assert a plea in 
bar in another,149 was characterized as inadequate representation 
by Army Boards of Review. 
Of course, this is not to say that every failure of counsel to put 
a potential defense witness, and especially the accused, on the stand 
to testify, or otherwise to present unlikely but possible defenses, 
will constitute inadequate representation.150 The question is one 
of effect upon the case as a whole, and unless the counsel during 
trial was so wrong that the deficiency was crystal-clear, his determi-
nation may not be criticized. 
One particular facet of counsel's duty to present all of the ac-
cused's defenses remains to be noted. While military law does not 
permit, much less require, the defense counsel to violate accepted 
standards of the civilian bar in presenting the accused's case,151 
counsel is required to urge every point which may be fairly urged 
in accused's behalf, although such action brings him into disfavor 
with his military superiors.152 Thus, the Court of Military Appeals 
has declared that a defense counsel who fails to urge as a defense 
147 C.M.O. 5-1949, p. llO. 
148 C.M. 194200, Sanderson, 2 B.R. 125 (1931). 
149 C.M. 315877, Ellis, 65 B.R. 151 (1946). See also United States v. Marshall, 2 
U.S.C.M.A. 54, 6 C.M.R. 54 at 58 (1952): "The brief, almost summary, record of trial 
resulting in conviction and imposition of the death sentence indicates a lack of effort on 
the part of defense counsel, and a lack of appreciation of the rights of these accused." 
150 See United States v. Castillo-Acevedo, (C.M. 1953) 12 C.M.R. 318 at 324. 
151 C.M. 240753, Shapiro, 26 B.R. 107 (1943), approved on the merits, Shapiro v. 
United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 at 207, n. I (1947) (putting impostor in 
accused's place); C.M.O. 10-1936, p. 3 (fabrication of evidence). 
152 See C.M.O. 6-1946, p. 218, where it was held that when defense counsel's superiors 
discouraged him from too vigorously defending the accused, the proceedings would be 
reversed regardless of accused's guilt. And in United States v. McMahan, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 
709, 21 C.M.R. 31 (1956), Judge Latimer declared at p. 39: "Because of the emphasis 
placed by military commanders on the desirability of speedy trials in homicide cases, 
appointed defenders are placed in an awkward and sometimes embarrassing position. 
Many times a request for a continuance is frowned upon by military commanders as being 
merely delaying tactics. Some convening authorities give too little thought to the basic 
requirements of preparation, particularly of capital cases, and defending counsel by seeking 
time to prepare his defense may incur the disapprobation of his command superior. 
However, he has a solemn duty to defend unreservedly the interests of the accused he has 
sworn to protect, and fear of disfavor should not deter him from using all honorable 
means to protect his client's cause. No system of justice can flourish if the representation 
afforded an accused person is to be neglected because of fear of reprisal. Nor can military 
justice succeed if those officers who must defend an accused inadequately protect him 
because they dare not assert every right guaranteed him by the Code." 
• 
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command control about which he knows clearly violates his duty 
as a defense counsel.153 · 
This present rule represents a distinct departure from the rule 
formerly in effect in the armed services that defense counsel's 
presentation of accused's case was limited by the admonition that 
it be "not inconsistent with military relations."154 The only case 
found which follows the spirit of this proviso is a naval case of pre-
World War II vintage.155 Here, an enlisted man was tried by 
order of the Secretary of the Navy upon three specifications under 
the general article. Counsel objected to the charge at the opening 
of the trial and again at the close of the case on the ground that the 
accused had been deprived of his rights to a speedy trial, and the 
court acquitted the accused. The Judge Advocate General re-
marked that he considered as improper that part of the argument 
by counsel for the accused relative to the merits of the case and 
delay in bringing the accused to trial. Concurring, the Chief of 
the Bureau: of Navigation declared: 
"It is understood that the counsel owes to the accused 
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, artd 
also owes to the accused the exertion of his utmost learning 
and ability, but it is the opinion of this Bureau that you have 
gone beyond the bounds of what is expected in behalf of the 
accused in that you have severely criticized those persons in 
the service upon whom devolved the duty of preparing the 
specifications and in expediting the Government's business 
in the preparation of the case for trial. You have been severe-
ly critical not only of the speed with which the accused was 
brought to trial and you have gone so far as to attack the 
fairness of the trial in view of the delay. 
"The Bureau cannot condone your conduct, and you are 
cautioned to exercise more care and to use better judgment 
in the future. 
"Acknowledge the receipt of this letter, a copy having 
been placed with your official record." 
It appears clear that in light of developments since the code 
was passed, the above case is not only no longer the law but that 
today counsel would be praised for and required to present to the 
158 United States v. Borner, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 313, 12 C.M.R. 69 at 71 (1953). While such 
neglect must certainly damage counsel's reputation as a lawyer, it is startling doctrine that 
it affects his credibility as a witness. 
154 Notes 26 and 43 supra. 
155 C.M.O. 6-1938, p. 7. But see C.M.O. 101-1903, p. 6, referring to the "commendable 
zeal of counsel." 
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court evidence that accused's constitutional rights to a speedy trial 
were violated, although such violation had the sanction of superior 
officers. Indeed, the very highest traditions of the bar, as em-
bodied and expressed in those cases which form the cornerstone of 
the Anglo-American concept of liberty under law, is the fearless 
protection by a lawyer of his client who is the victim of oppression 
by people in power. Such protection, if anything, is even more 
necessary in the military, where traditional safeguards of repre-
sentative government against official oppression are lacking. In 
thus assimilating the duties of defense counsel in this area to 
those of civilian attorneys, recent legislative and judicial pro-
nouncements made more useful the function of the military attor-
ney, for while instances of official oppression will be few in Amer-
ica's modern armed services, with their democratic traditions, they 
are made rarer still by the vigilance of an alert military bar. 
Of course, this is not to say that counsel's duty to the accused 
requires him to give vent to all of accused's grievances, real or 
fancied, against his superiors. A court-martial is not a grievance 
committee, and any attempt to make it into a forum for general 
criticism of accused's superiors or the service as a whole is bound 
to boomerang. Indeed, counsel's duty of adequate representation 
requires him to admonish the :;tccused to stick to the case at hand 
while on the stand. It is only where criticism of superiors is an 
unavoidable part of the full presentation of accused's defense or 
case in mitigation that it should be indulged in. 
Finally, the duty of adequate representation may not be dis-
charged when counsel fails to present to the court a closing argu-
ment, analyzing and summing up the evidence, especially in an 
important and complex case.156 Thus, in a capital case, after trial 
counsel, "in a lengthy and able closing argument, drummed into 
the minds of the fact-finders many of the inferences which could 
be drawn from the Government evidence," the defense counsel 
failed to present any closing argument at all. Noting that, except 
in unusual circumstances, failure to argue "is for all practical 
purposes an admission of guilt," Judge Latimer declared that "the 
presentation of a 'jury argument' is a virtual cornerstone of the 
universal right to assistance of counsel,"157 and for this, coupled 
with other deficiencies in counsel's performance, reversed the con-
viction. 
156 C.M. 200989, Osman, 5 B.R. 11 at 39 (1933). See also United States v. Wallace, 
(A.C.M.S. 1953) 10 C.M.R. 937. 
157United States v. McMahan, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 709, 21 C.M.R. 31 at 43 (1956). 
376 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
F. The Test of Adequacy 
From the cases which have been discussed above, it can be seen 
that there is no hard and fast test for adequacy of representation. 
Whether representation of the accused was adequate or not de-
pends upon the performance of counsel as a whole. Individual 
tidbits in the record may not be extracted, sampled, and used as 
the basis for judgment of the performance of the trial attorney 
below. 
An accused is entitled to have his case, such as it may be, pre-
sented to the court in the best light possible. Some cases are hope-
less from the start, and counsel cannot be condemned for not 
pulling rabbits out of a hat and inventing defenses which do not 
exist. What he has, he must put to advantage; more than that he 
cannot do. 
Of course, cases may be hopeless in some respects and not in 
others. A crime may have been committed, but it may be a lesser 
included one in the one charged. A penalty may be certain to be 
assessed, but reduction of the contemplated one may be possible. 
No accused can expect counsel to deliver the moon, but he may 
be expected to reach for such fruits of the accused's case as are 
reasonably within grasp. 
The fact that counsel loses does not show inadequacy, as tµere 
are some cases which the most brilliant counsel could not win; 
just as the fact that he wins also is not conclusive of competency, 
since there are cases which the poorest attorney cannot lose. The 
mettle of a lawyer is shown in the in-between cases, and here the 
accused may expect only professional competency and nothing 
more. All competent lawyers are adequate, but some are more 
adequate than others. For this special gift which marks an attorney 
as an outstanding member of the bar, a defendant pays a special 
premium. An accused before a court-martial cannot expect such 
talent in his assigned counsel. 
· A word may be said as to the duty of adequate representation 
by appellate counsel, on which there have been no cases. Here, 
too, such duty exists and, although there is much less scope for 
counsel's work, since the record is already made, nevertheless there 
are areas for the operation of appellate tactics which mark some 
appellate lawyers off from others. Shall every possible error be 
assigned, and risk the important getting lost in the trivial, or shall 
only the major points be noted, and risk neglecting to raise a point 
which may be the only reversible error in the case, although it does 
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not seem significant at fi.rst?158 Shall many cases be cited, and risk 
overloading the brief, or shall only a few be included, and risk the 
possibility that the court will conclude that counsel lacks authority 
for his statements? These, and many other problems of research, 
writing, and preparation of argument must be coped with by the 
appellate defense lawyer.159 His duty to the accused is the same, 
in its final analysis, as that of trial counsel-to put the accused's 
case before the court in the best possible form he is able.160 
IV. CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
Canon 6: 
"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to dis-
close to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the 
parties, and any interest in or connection with the con-
troversy, which might influence the client in the selection of 
counsel. 
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, 
except by express consent of all concerned given after a full 
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a 
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one 
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another 
client requires him to oppose . ... " 
A. Representation of Go-Accused 
I. During the Same Trial. The prohibition against repre-
senting conflicting interests, so tenaciously maintained in civilian 
law practice, is upheld with equal vigor in military law. The duty 
of military counsel to represent the accused "with undivided fidel-
ity" is one of the oldest duties of military counsel to a defendant 
before a court-martial. 
The earliest situation to arise where representation of conflict-
ing interests was condemned is found in a pre-World War II army 
case. Those were the days when the reform wave right after World 
158 In Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), eminent counsel for appellants did 
not raise the issue on which the court decided the case. See Shulman, "The Demise of 
Swift v. Tyson," 47 YALE L.J. 1336 at 1338, 1342 (1938). 
159 See, generally, Avins, "Military Law Brief Writing," 4 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 77 
(April 1958). 
160 See Krivoski v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 451, 145 F. Supp. 239 at 243 (1956): 
"Plaintiff's case was briefed and argued by plaintiff's counsel in the present case before 
the Judicial Council .•.• No doubt the present counsel, who is skilled in such matters, 
fully presented all the facts of the case before the Judicial Council." See also C.M. 200989, 
Osman, 5 B.R. 11 at 20 (1933). 
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War I had receded, and Boards of Review were not especially 
known for their solicitude toward defendants. Nevertheless, so 
deep-rooted was this doctrine that it blossomed even in such un-
likely soil. In this case, four co-accused were tried for larceny of 
an automobile. Three of them maintained that the fourth accused, 
Kozo, invited them for a drive and that they knew nothing about 
who owned the car until they were arrested. Counsel for the four 
defendants requested a severance on the grounds that the defense 
of the three would be antagonistic to Kozo's interests, but this was 
denied. Thereafter, the defense counsel not only attempted to 
prove on direct examination of the other three accused that Kozo 
was the only thief, but in his argument to the court stated that the 
person who drove the car was alone guilty of larceny. It was held 
that fatal error resulted from this representation of conflicting 
interests.161 
The next condemnation of the representation of conflicting 
interests came during World War Il.162 Here, the doctrine was 
extended to include situations which did not result in the defense 
counsel actually 'prosecuting the accused, as the above case had. 
Counsel represented two accused, McRae and White. White 
pleaded guilty, having confessed to the crime. He was then called 
by the prosecution and testified as to his own guilt, implicating 
McRae as his accomplice, so that McRae was convicted solely on 
his testimony. Noting that "there was nothing in his testimony 
relating to any extenuating circumstances," the :Soard of Review 
concluded that "the purpose in permitting White, who could be-
come a competent witness only upon his own request ... to testify 
for the prosecution was to obtain for him ... a milder punishment 
than that imposed upon his accomplice." The Board soundly 
reasoned that to "tum state's evidence" to obtain leniency is not 
"a defensive strategy ordinarily planned and executed without the 
suggestion and advice of counsel." Furthermore, since defense 
counsel in this case made no objection or any effort to prevent 
White from testifying, the Board argued that he "participated in 
the effort to obtain a lighter sentence for White ... [and] did not 
abandon the defense of White and devote his efforts exclusively 
to the defense of McRae." The Board concluded that "since he 
made no attempt of any kind to protect McRae from the damaging 
testimony of White . . . his undivided efforts cannot be said to 
161 C.M. 194997, Elberson, 2 B.R. 173 (1931). 
162 C.M. P.O.A. 283, McRae, 1 P.O.A. 153 (1945). 
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have been given to McRae." As a result of this representation of 
conflicting interests, the final sentence of McRae, as approved by 
the reviewing authority, was twice that of White, although the 
latter was the instigator. The Board, in reversing for this repre-
sentation of conflicting interests, declared: 
"The authorities, heretofore cited, entitle every accused 
to have counsel devote his undivided attention and efforts on 
his own behalf. When the defense is forced by the conflicting 
interests of two accused to cross-examine one of them and to 
state to the court in effect that one of the two accused whom 
he represents is lying (it is significant that in his argument 
in the present case defense counsel did not indicate which 
one), he is admittedly not giving to each of them that un-
swerving loyalty required by the existing relationship."163 
The prohibition against representation of conflicting interests 
on trial has been carried over and broadened since the adoption 
of the code. Thus, in two cases which are not dissimilar to the 
first case noted above the same result was reached. In one, a trial 
for murder, after the law officer denied a severance, requested on 
the grounds of inconsistent defense, two co-accused took the stand 
and under guidance of their common defense counsel each blamed 
the other. Conflicting testimony by witnesses for the prosecution 
as to who fired the fatal shot was also given but in cross-examination 
counsel refrained from resolving this. The conviction here was 
reversed.164 Likewise, in a similar situation, the same result was 
reached, and it was further noted that the law officer must refrain 
from suggesting, let alone insisting, that counsel should undertake 
to represent conflicting interests.165 
Of course, there is nothing wrong with one lawyer representing 
co-accused if their defenses are not inconsistent, and this may even 
be advantageous.166 Nor does representation of one accused make 
the attorney a lawyer, ipso facto, for all.167 However, a military 
attorney must refrain from representing defendants with conflict-
163 Id. at 157. And to the same effect are the remarks of the theater Assistant Judge 
Advocate General at p. 159. See also United States v. Faylor, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 26 C.M.R. 
327 (1958). 
164 United States v. Self, (C.M. 1953) 13 C.M.R. 227. See also MANUAL FOR COURTS• 
MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, ,r48c, p. 68, requiring counsel to advise co-accused of conflicting 
interests. 
165 United States v. King, (C.M. 1954) 17 C.M.R. 423. 
166 United States v. Evans, I U.S.C.M.A. 541, 4 C.M.R. 133 (1952); United States v. 
Young, IO U.S.C.M.A. 97, 27 C.M.R. 171 (1959). 
167 United States v. Brown, (A.C.M. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 823. But it does if he has par-
ticipated in a common defense with the co-accused or his counsel. 
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ing defenses at the same trial: an entire conviction will be reversed 
if there are conflicting defenses to only part of the offenses charged, 
if the charges arose from one transaction.168 Thus it is that the 
military law, like civilian law, seeks to insure that the defendant's 
lawyer devotes his full efforts and energies to the defendant's 
interests alone. 
2. At Different Trials. The doctrine that counsel must not 
represent defendants with conflicting interests at the same trial 
has recently been expanded by the Court of Military Appeals to 
ban a military lawyer from defending co-actors in the same crime 
who are tried separately, where their interests are antagonistic. In 
the first such case, United State'~ v. Lovett,169 the two defendants 
were charged with assault, the major issue being identity. One of 
them, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty at his trial in accord-
ance with a pre-trial agreement. He then became the "star" prose-
cution witness at accused's trial in which accused's counsel was the 
same lawyer who had previously represented the witness, and gave 
the only testimony linking accused with the offense. It thus can 
be seen that this case is on all fours with McRae, except for the 
fact of separate trials. Without, however, giving the slightest sign 
of the awareness of the existence of McRae, the court reversed, 
declaring that "counsel must ... represent his client with undivided 
loyalty," citing Canon 6. 
The rule of the above case, banning a lawyer from representing 
an accused when he has previously represented a prosecution wit-
ness, has been applied in several later cases, and now may be said 
to be settled law.170 The major area of disagreement within the 
court seems to revolve around the question, not of whether this is 
error, but whether, in particular cases, it was prejudicial to the 
accused. Thus, in United States v. Thornton,171 the majority of 
the court, stressing the fact that the attorney failed to cross-examine 
his erstwhile client sufficiently and the possibility that the court 
may have disbelieved that part of the witness' testimony favorable 
to accused because of his prior relationship to counsel, felt that the 
duty to preserve the witness' confidences was a virtual albatross 
168 United States v. Best, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 39, 19 C.M.R. 165 (1955). 
169 7 U.S.C.M.A. 704, 23 C.M.R. 168 at 171 (1957). 
170 United States v. Eskridge, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 261, 24 C.M.R. 71 (1957); United States v. 
Grzegorczyk, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 571, 25 C.M.R. 75 (1958); United States v. Moore, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 
284, 26 C.M.R. 64 (1958). 
1718 U.S.C.M.A. 57, 23 C.M.R. 281 (1957). 
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around the neck of counsel.172 Judge Latimer, dissenting in part, 
was unwilling to find prejudice from the situation alone, and would 
have required a showing of specific prejudice.173 It would appear, 
however, that the majority view has more to commend it in terms 
of the over-all picture of judicial administration. Counsel who has 
previously represented a witness now hostile to his present client's 
interests carries a burden of protection of the witness which may 
severely limit his maneuverability. Counsel should be free to strike 
at the witness from any angle. A previous relationship forecloses 
some of those angles. It would appear that Judge Latimer's views 
are that accused must make a showing that counsel would other-
wise have explored these angles, but the very prior relationship 
which prevents attack in this direction also prevents revelation 
that attack in this direction was feasible. Thus, if prejudice exists, 
the very relationship which creates it operates to conceal it. Hence, 
the majority approach of casting on counsel the duty to show 
freedom from error appears more sound. 
Since an attorney may not be a trial counsel in accused's case if 
he has represented accused's accomplice at a previous trial,174 it 
would appear that the accomplice who turns "state's evidence" is 
in effect assimilated to a third party in interest, whose position 
differs from both the accused and the prosecution, and hence his 
counsel should represent neither at the second trial. However, 
should such co-actor not take the stand for the prosecution, or 
otherwise have a defense antagonistic to accused, representation by 
the same lawyer is perfectly proper.175 
An interesting twist to the normal pattern is found in a late 
pre-code case, where the accused himself was the accomplice who 
turned state's evidence against the principal in a prior trial.176 In 
his trial, the regularly appointed defense counsel who aided the 
counsel hired by accused was the attorney for the principal in the 
previous case. On appeal, the Judicial Council disagreed with 
accused's contentions that counsel's prior connection with the case 
disabled him from effectively representing the accused. It con-
cluded that counsel had no more reason to protect the principal 
172 Id. at 283. 
173 Id. at 289. 
174 United States v. Homan, (A.C.M. 1952) 6 C.M.R. 504; United States v. Kelsey. 
(A.C.M. 1952) 6 C.M.R. 522. 
rns United States v. Hopwood, (A.C.M. 1957) 23 C.M.R. 937. 
176 C.M. 343792, Krivoski, 12 J.C. 81 (1950). See also Krivoski v. United States, 136 
Ct. Cl. 451, 145 F. Supp. 239 (1956). 
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oecause his trial was over, and there was little likelihood that evi-
dence elicited at accused's trial would be used against the principal. 
In addition, emphasis was placed on accused's consent with knowl-
edge of the facts, and the possibility that counsel was chosen be-
cause of his very knowledge of the case. It might also be noted 
that accused's co-actor was not a witness, thus materially lessening 
any possibility of actual conflict of interests. 
B. Taking Inconsistent Positions 
I. Accuser and Investigating Officer as Defense Counsel. In 
addition to the actual representation of conflicting interests mili-
tary law forbids the defense counsel to take inconsistent positions. 
The first application of this duty of loyalty toward the accused 
occurs when counsel has previously compromised his effectiveness 
by taking a position inconsistent with his subsequent duties. 
The earliest application of this rule referred to accusers. Thus, 
the fact that counsel was the accuser, as well as a witness for the 
prosecution and accused's commander, began as a "noteworthy 
irregularity,"177 but after World War II became a fatal error. In 
the first case so holding, the Board of Review stressed the fact that 
defense counsel had previously asserted under oath that the charges 
were true and declared that he was therefore disabled from pro-
viding the accused with effective representation.178 While the ac-
cused may waive the defect, if he has full knowledge of the facts,1 79 
in view of the "glaringly apparent" inconsistency between the two 
positions, every presumption is indulged against waiver, and it has 
been held that a statement by counsel that accused agreed to have 
him represent accused is not the equivalent of the requisite specific 
request for the accuser's services in preference to other counsel.180 
To constitute a waiver, it must be demonstrated that accused was 
"advised of the exact nature of the situation" and "particularly 
desired to be defended by the accuser" as distinguished from a 
177 C.M. 194200, Sanderson, 2 B.R. 125 (1931); E.T.O. 4155, Broadus, 12 E.T.O. 33 
at 38· (1945). 
178 C.M. 284066, Mejie, 55 B.R. 241 (1945). The Board declared at p. 244: "Thus 
military law forbids the accuser to sit in judgment upon the man he has accused. For 
equally good reasons, the law forbids an accuser to purport to defend the man he has 
accused. For an accuser to serve in such inconsistent capacities is unfair to himself, unfair 
to the court, and a mockery of the requirement that he must serve the accused with 'undi-
vided fidelity' and by all 'honorable and legitimate means known to the law.' Observance 
of these simple principles compels the conclusion that the record of trial is legally insuffi-
cient to sustain the findings of guilty and the sentence.'' 
179 C.M. 320233, Fleming, 69 B.R. 271 (1947). 
1so C.M. 320391, McDonald, 69 B.R. 337 (1947). 
1960] MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL 383 
mere passive acceptance of his services.181 Hence, in a case where 
the accuser stated that defendant deserted, that he completely dis-
regarded military discipline, that he would be "a definite detri-
ment to the service if retained," and that he should be eliminated 
from the service, recommending trial by general court-martial for 
this purpose, it was held .that to assign accused's commander to 
defend accused against the charges which he himself had initiated 
·without the most express request of accused after a full disclosure 
of the above facts constituted fatal error.182 
The above rule, soon after its formulation, was extended to 
include cases wherein investigating officers served as defense coun-
sel. The first such case was one in which counsel had failed to 
protect the rights of the accused adequately.183 The Board of 
Review found that it was "impossible to ignore" counsel's dual role 
because of "the grossly perfunctory manner in which the defense 
of the accused in the instant case was conducted." Noting that, 
as investigating officer, his report is regarded as an official statement 
that he believes the charges recommended for trial are true, and 
that he had recommended trial by general court-martial, the Board 
declared, "This record eloquently proclaims the grave dangers 
inherent in placing an officer in the compromising position of act-
ing as investigating officer and defense counsel in the same case." 
As with accusers, this too was originally only a "bad practice" 
which "should be condemned," and not fatal to the legal sufficiency 
of the case.184 Its elevation to the status of fatal error occurred 
through the recognition that the investigating officer is on the 
prosecution's side, practically speaking, that "their positions are 
compatible," and therefore "when the investigating officer then 
takes up the side of the defense he has placed himself in an incon-
sistent position which is incompatible with his prior view of the 
matter as investigating officer." 
Of course, the accused may waive the defect; otherwise it might 
constitute an abridgment of his right to counsel of his own choos-
ing.185 Such waiver must be, however, with full knowledge of the 
181 Sp.C.M. 2236, Smith, 7 J.C. 281 at 283 (1950). 
182 C.M. 324883, Ewing, 73 B.R. 383 (1947). 
183 C.M. 315877, Ellis, 65 B.R. 151 at 156 (1946). 
184 Id. at 156; C.M. 211878, Mitchell; C.M. 211941, McMullen, otherwise unreported. 
"In the McMullen case the Chief of the Military Justice Section stated: 'True again he 
pleaded guilty, but if anything this makes the case worse. Interested to have his official 
recommendation already made in the case sustained he might well have endorsed the plea 
of guilty. Certainly, if he did anything for accused it does not appear in the record.'" 
185 C.M. 315877, Ellis, 65 B.R. 151 (1946); C.M. 324701, Stevenson, 75 B.R. 399 (1948); 
E.T.O. 1100, Simmons, 4 E.T.O. 1 (1944). 
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facts and attendant inconsistency, and a mere formalized statement 
accepting the previously appointed defense counsel will not meet 
the required standard.186 
T~e prohibition against an investigating officer acting as de-
fense counsel unless expressly requested by accused has now been 
codified.187 The accuser is also, by the manual, disqualified from 
acting as defense counsel unless the accused expressly requests his 
services.188 
2. Counsel Switching Sides. The duty of loyalty to an accused 
on the part of the military lawyer and his corollary duty not to 
represent interests which conflict with those of his serviceman-
client ban a military attorney from switching sides in the same 
case, and thereby taking inconsistent positions. A switch either 
way, whether from prosecution to defense or from defense to prose-
cution, is equally forbidden. 
In the earliest pre-code case, it was the assistant trial judge 
advocate who, after working on the case for the prosecution, showed 
up at trial as assistant defense counsel. The trial judge advocate 
strenuously objected to his participation on the ground that it 
"would not be ethical," and the court sustained the objection. The 
Board of Review labeled this an "unauthorized and unheard-of 
challenge," castigated the proceedings as "a wanton abridgment 
of his (accused's) constitutional rights and a flagrant denial of due 
process of law" and reversed the conviction.189 Here, of course, it 
was beneficial to the accused to have as his attorney one who had 
already become privy to the prosecution's secrets, and the Board 
of Review saw nothing unethical in this. The drafters of the Uni-
form Code190 and the Manual for Courts-Martial191 disagreed, 
however, and made members of the prosecution staff ineligible to 
serve as accused's counsel, a step fully in keeping with the obliga-
tions of prosecuting attorneys in criminal practice generally.192 
Oddly enough, the only reported occasion for the application 
of this ban on switching from prosecution to defense was in a 
186 C.M. 316898, Mesquite, 66 B.R. 107 (1946); C.M. 318975, Thomas, 68 B.R. 109 
(1947); C.M. 319176, Henry, 68 B.R. 181 (1947). 
187 U.C.M.J., art. Zl (a). United States v. Smith, (A.C.M. 1957) 24: C.M.R. 578. 
188 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, ~6a, p. 10, ~6lf (4), p. 88. 
189 C.M. 313II8, Brown, 63 B.R. 13 at 17 (194:6). 
190 U .C.M.J ., art. 27 (a). 
191 Members of the prosecution's staff are not even available for service as individual 
counsel. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, ~48b, P· 68. 
192 DRINKER, LEGAL Enucs 118 (1953). 
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situation where such dual status operated to the detriment of the 
defense. In United States v. Benge,193 accused were tried by juve-
nile court proceedings. Later, deeming its sentence too lenient, 
their commander discussed his desire to prosecute them further 
with a JAG lieutenant, who suggested appropriate charges for trial 
by court-martial. Subsequently, the lieutenant acted as defense 
counsel during trial without disclosing his prior participation in 
the case. Noting the possibility that some of the specifications 
failed to state an offense in this case, the Board declared, "It re-
quires, we think, no very acute perception to see that a legal advisor 
who recommends or participates in the drafting of court-martial 
specifications is not well qualified or likely thereafter to urge, on 
behalf of an accused, errors or deficiencies therein."194 Then, turn-
ing on its head the policy basis for the Article 27 (a) ban on mem-
bers of the prosecution subsequently acting for the defense, the 
Board reads Congress' intent as one to preserve "counsel's undi-
vided loyalty to the accused," and not to cure the rule of the case 
above noted. While it is clear beyond dispute that the lieutenant's 
action herein violated the terms of the statutory ban, and it is also 
probable that his action in switching sides under the peculiar facts 
of this case operated to accused's detriment, instead of to his bene-
fit, as it normally would, it does not follow that the unusual injury 
herein suffered was the object of congressional solicitude in this 
aspect of the statute, for while the accused may waive all other 
disqualifications of his attorney, this one he may not waive. There-
fore, counsel's action may be condemned as a violation of his statu-
tory duty to the government, or criticized as representation of the 
accused without disclosure of a bias which would reduce his effec-
tiveness, but it cannot be decried as a violation of loyalty to the 
accused. Thus the Board came to the right result via the wrong 
road. 
It is, however, with the problem of ex-defense counsel appear-
ing as prosecutors in the same case that military courts have been 
most concerned. In the earliest such reported case,195 decided 
before the code, the accused was prosecuted for assault. There 
was highly contradictory evidence as to who the assailant was, and 
a key witness testified that accused was not the assailant. The trial 
judge advocate, who had been accused's counsel in pre-trial in-
193 (C.M. 1957) 24 C.M.R. 458. 
194 Id. at 460. 
195 C.M. 333433, Alvaro-Rodriguez, 81 B.R. 359 (1949). 
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vestigation and as such had interviewed the witness, attempted to 
impeach her testimony. The Board, in reversing, first noted the 
civilian rule that such "inconsistent relationship" was banned, 
citing several civilian cases196 and the Canons of Ethics. It then 
refused "to speculate as to the reasons for the Trial Judge Advo-
cate's persistent efforts to 'break' this witness," hypothesizing the 
possibility that he "could have entertained a feeling of moral cer-
tainty that Miss Gonzalez was committing perjury and therefore 
most vulnerable because of what accused had told him in confi-
dence during their attorney-client relationship." Unwilling to 
resolve this doubt against accused, the Board not only applied the 
civilian rule but went farther and stated that "the fact that the 
defender-prosecutor was an officer in the Army of the United 
States, and the accused was a soldier, would seemingly magnify the 
gravity of the error and add to the vulnerability of the record."197 
Thus the Board correctly gave weight to the possibility that the 
soldier would rely on the officer for advice and protection even 
absent this professional relationship,198 and soundly reasoned that 
such likelihood, stemming from military relations, would com-
pound the error. · 
The rule of the above case was codified in 1951,199 and military 
appellate tribunals have assiduously applied it to all aspects of 
court-martial work. The most common type of situation in which 
this rule operates is where accused's counsel during a pre-trial 
investigation later acts for the prosecution. This is invariably held 
to be fatal error.200 
196 The Board quoted two pages from People v. Gerold, 265 m. 448, 107 N.E. 165 
(1914) alone. 
197 C.M. 333433, Alvaro-Rodriguez, 81 B.R. 359 at 366-367 (1949). 
198 See discussion in Avins, "The Joker in Jester-The Parris Island Death March 
Case," 53 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 33 at 41 (1958). 
199 U.C.M.J., art. 27 (a); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, ,r6a, pp. 9-10. In 
United States v. Stringer, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 494, 16 C.M.R. 68 (1954), Judge Brosman declared 
at p. 75: "The principles underlying the relevant portion of Article 27 (a) are fundamental 
in the law and have been discussed frequently by courts and other authorities. The ex-
clusion predicated in the Article adopts for the military establishment those basic pre-
cepts of the civilian law to the effect that a lawyer must not represent conflicting interests, 
nor permit himself to be placed in such a position that he may be required to choose 
between such interests .•.. In both civil and criminal cases the civilian courts have been 
concerned primarily with preserving the confidential relationship between attorney and 
client and avoiding all possibility that counsel may utilize against former clients privi-
leged information received by reason of this relationship." To the same effect, see United 
States v. Bell, (A.C.M. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 804. 
200 United States v. Bishop, (A.C.M. 1952) 6 C.M.R. 719 (assistant trial counsel); 
United States v. Danilson, (A.C.M. 1953) 11 C.M.R. 692 (same); United States v. Duston, 
(C.M. 1955) 19 C.M.R. 537 (preparation of SJA's advice as "administrative officer"). 
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A good example of this situation is United States v. Green,201 
where accused's pre-trial counsel later prepared a memorandum of 
testimony, which would probably be offered against the accused 
on trial, which was forwarded through the staff judge advocate to 
the trial counsel. It was held that although the aid given to the 
trial counsel was indirect and slight, this was enough to constitute 
a breach of professionc!-1 duty requiring reversal.202 
The above rule has also been applied where accused's defense 
counsel at his original trial became trial counsel at his rehearing, 203 
and where trial counsel had been the defense counsel for accused's 
accomplice at a previous trial.204 
The prohibition against switching sides has also been extended 
to cover one situation indigenous to military service. This occurs 
when a serviceman desires legal advice and assistance in respect to 
a situation in which he is involved, and which later becomes the 
subject of court-martial action. His natural and logical inclination 
leads him to the base legal office to consult an attorney there, and 
in doing so he establishes an attorney-client relationship with the 
legal assistance officer, precluding that officer from later acting for 
the prosecution in a trial involving charges related to the subject 
of the conversation.205 Nor does it matter that the filing of charges 
was not necessarily contemplated at the time. Indeed, in one case 
where the conference was held only after both accused and the 
lawyer knew that charges might be filed, the Court of Military 
Appeals held that an attorney-client relationship was established 
notwithstanding the express prohibition of paragraph I Ob, AR 
600-13, against giving advice where the subject matter is, or will be, 
the subject of court-martial action.206 
The small size of legal staffs on even the largest bases, com-
pared to the number of lawyers in any fair-sized city, makes it im-
possible for military attorneys to be as selective about legal duties 
as their civilian counterparts are. When the current shortage of 
2015 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 18 C.M.R. 234 (1955). 
202 Id. at 238. Canons 6 and 37 were cited as authority in this case. 
203 United States v. Mace, (A.C.M. 1952) 5 C.M.R. 610. 
204 United States v. Homan, (A.C.M. 1952) 6 C.M.R. 504. The Board noted at p. 507, 
"Precedents, legion in number, condemn and decry any relaxation of the basic doctrine 
that counsel must not represent conflicting interests." Accord, United States v. Kelsey, 
(A.C.M. 1952) 6 C.M.R. 522. 
205 United States v. Brownell, (A.C.M. 1954) 17 C.M.R. 741; United States v. KeIIum, 
(A.C.M. 1957) 23 C.M.R. 882. 
206 United States v. McCluskey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 20 C.M.R. 261 (1955). The court 
was unimpressed by the argument that the drafting of a request for a deposition to estab-
lish an essential element of an offense was merely an "administrative" task. 
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military lawyers is added to this fact, it can readily be seen that the 
performance of various tasks, including acting sometimes as pros-
ecutor and sometimes as defense counsel, is made necessary. This 
switching of roles makes all the more necessary the exercise of 
vigilance to insure that it does not occur in the handling of the 
same case, even though no element of personal gain or other im-
proper motive is involved.207 The assimiJation of civilian stand-
ards into military law makes clear that the expeditious dispatch 
of business can never serve as an excuse for inadequate attention 
to a defendant's rights. 
3. Post-Trial Inconsistency. Military defense counsel is not 
only forbidden to take an inconsistent position with respect to his 
client before or during trial, but he may not do so after trial, or 
even after his attorney-client relationship has formally ended. 
While in civilian practice, this type of conflict would most often 
occur by representing a client with adverse interests, 208 such an 
occurrence is relatively rare in the military. More frequently, the 
conflict arises when the defense lawyer attempts to cast off his 
partisan character and assume the role of impartial judge after 
trial and pass on his case upon initial review in his office. A recent 
line of cases dealing with the post-trial clemency report and con-
vening authority's review, practices peculiar to the military justice 
system, holds that this may not be done. 
In the first such case,209 accused's pre-trial counsel assumed the 
role of "Assistant Staff Judge Advocate" and interviewed the ac-
cused after trial to prepare a "Post-Trial Clemency Interview" 
report. Accused told his ex-counsel that he would meet any pro-
bationary period that might be imposed in a suspension of the 
dishonorable discharge to which he was sentenced, but the attorney 
recommended approval of the sentence as adjudged and against 
suspending the discharge. Such report and recommendation were 
adopted by the convening authority's staff judge advocate. The 
Board, presuming that the attorney performed duties as counsel 
before trial, reasoned that his recommendations adverse to the 
accused's desires may have been based upon confidential informa-
201 In United States v. Green, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 18 C.M.R. 234 (1955), Judge Brosman 
declared at p. 240: "Since the rigid responsibility imposed on attorneys is applied with 
full vigor in the military establishment, we experience no difficulty in condemning the 
performance of the two officers in the instant case-however much it may have been due 
to nothing more reprehensible than thoughtlessness." 
208 DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 103, 109, 111, 115 (1953). 
200 United States v. Bryant, (A.C.M. 1954) 16 C.M.R. 747. 
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tion obtained from accused. This possibility alone was enough 
to compromise the relationship and to so taint the report as to 
require a reversal. Citing Canons 6 and 37 of the ABA Canons of 
Professional Ethics, the Board declared: 
"The termination of the attorney-client relationship does 
not terminate the attorney's obligation to the client to pre-
serve the privilege implicit in the confidential communica-
tions and to abstain from taking any part in the proceedings 
contrary to the client's interest. The privilege in pertinent 
respects might well be classified as eternal because it is, with 
certain exceptions not applicable here, not limited to the 
duration of the litigation."210 
While it can thus be seen that the compelling factor in the 
above case was the attorney-client privilege,211 the Board also 
adverted to the duty of defense counsel not to take any position 
contrary to his former client's interests. This subordinate ground 
for the decision in Bryant soon became the principal ground on 
which this line of cases rests. 
In United States v. Vinson,212 accused's erstwhile attorney con-
ducted the post-trial clemency interview with accused, and in his 
report stated that the accused could not give him a concrete answer 
to whether he desired to stay in the service and make it a career or 
get out, and that at one time he expressed a desire to stay in, while 
at another he preferred to complete his enlistment and return to 
civilian life. The attorney's recommendation, in which the staff 
judge advocate concurred, was t4at the dishonorable discharge be 
reduced to a bad conduct discharge and ordered executed. In 
reversing, the Board of Review held that it is not necessary for a 
defense counsel to switch sides and actively aid the prosecution in 
order to take a position adverse to his former client. "It is 
enough," they declared, "if he takes any position in the proceed-
ing which is substantially adverse to an active advocacy in favor of 
his former client."213 In this case, the Board noted that the 
attorney's remarks, although not totally antagonistic to the accused, 
were adverse to his best interests. Thus, it may be laid down as a 
rule in military courts that if an erstwhile defense counsel recom-
mends accused's elimination from the service, he violates his duty 
210 Id. at 751. 
211 Note also United States v. Quindana, (A.C.M. 1953) 12 C.M.R. 790 at 794. 
212 (A.C.M. 1955) 19 C.M.R. 919. 
21s Id. at 922. 
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to his former client by the assumption of an adverse position to his 
client's interests, and any review predicated on such violation of 
duty is fatally tainted.214 
The military adoption of the civilian rule that an attorney's 
future faithfulness in the same transaction will be enforced 
regardless of whether the attorney has received privileged con-
fidences215 is most clearly illustrated by a decision in which the 
convening authority's staff judge advocate recommended that 
accused receive no clemency. One of the reasons for the recom-
mendation was stated to be that the accused never cooperated with 
his defense counsel. The appointed counsel also informed the 
staff judge advocate that accused had been a belligerent source of 
trouble to him, and counsel stated that accused had been most 
uncooperative and that the accused had been caught time and 
again in obvious inconsistencies most of which were insignificant. 
This information was forwarded to the staff judge advocate at 
general court-martial level who referred to it in his review. The 
Board of Review reasoned that the disclosure about accused's in-
consistencies classified him as a liar, unworthy of clemency. They 
further noted that activity so diametrically opposed to defense ad-
vocacy made the other statements suspect. The sum total of these 
revelations, they held, were so inconsistent with advocacy in the 
accused's favor in any form that the several reviews based thereon 
could not stand.216 
The risk of having an uncooperative client is one of the hazards 
of a military law practice. In civilian practice if the situation be-
comes intolerable the attorney may always ask to be replaced.217 
In military practice, neither the safety valve of relief from duty 
nor the hope of reward is present to mitigate the lawyer's annoy-
ance. Moreover, the military attorney still has the duty to carry 
on as best he can. A defendant has no duty to cooperate with 
counsel and, although he takes the risk of lessening the effective-
ness of his defense, counsel may not add to that risk by airing his 
grievances, especially to one, such as the staff judge advocate, who 
is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in accused's case. 
Counsel's duty to his erstwhile client goes so far as not even to 
assume the position of an impartial commentator on the defend-
214 United States v. Marquez, (A.C.M.S. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 736. Cf. United States v. 
Darring, 9 U .S.C.M.A. 651, 26 C.M.R. 431 (1958). 
215 United States v. Brown, (A.C.M. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 823. 
216 United States v. Casey, (A.C.M.S. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 853. 
217' DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 140 (1953). 
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ant's case. Thus, in one case, counsel acted in a dual capacity as 
both defense counsel and staff judge advocate to the convening 
authority. It was held that in his role as staff judge advocate, he 
was under a duty to base his recommendations upon the best in-
terests of the military service; but as defense counsel, he was under 
a duty to base his recommendations on accused's best interests. 
For thus assuming potentially inconsistent positions, the action 
based on his review was reversed.216 Hence, it is now settled that 
defense counsel may take no post-trial position other than that of 
continuing to urge the accused's interests. 
C. The Duty of Loyalty 
No man can serve two masters well, and lawyers constitute no 
exception to this rule. The military law is firm in the require-
ment that military attorneys make no attempt to try.219 
A civilian attorney owes an obligation of loyalty to his client 
which prevents him from representing interests which might con-
flict with those of the client.220 This obligation has no less of a 
binding force in the armed services. Even doubtful conduct on 
the part of the lawyer must be resolved against him, not only to 
circumvent the dishonest practitioner's malfeasance, but also to 
prevent the upright lawyer from placing himself in such a position 
as to require him to choose between conflicting duties.221 Of 
course, in the armed services, while there is no monetary induce-
ment to breach the bonds of loyalty which tie a lawyer to an ac-
cused, lack of personnel, lack of care, desire to cut corners to 
dispatch business, and sometimes just plain apathy may result in 
21s United States v. Draper, (A.C.M.S. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 743. See also United States v. 
Brown, (A.C.M. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 823. But cf. United States v. Wilson, (C.M. 1955) 19 
C.M.R. 426, where accused's pre-trial counsel acted as law officer. It was held that since 
accused pleaded guilty, there was no prejudice. 
219 See C.M. 204639, McMullen, 8 B.R. 25 (1936). Here accused, a JAGD colonel, who 
was for some years counsel to the Assistant Secretary of War, always gave advice favorable 
to a contractor, from whom he was then accused of taking gifts. The Board of Review 
declared at p. 45: "For a number of years accused advised The Assistant Secretary of 
War ••• on legal matters pertaining to contracts in which Mr. Silverman was vitally 
interested. In most instances the legal advice given by accused was erroneous. This fact 
in itself is significant in view of the service and experience of accused. However, its sig-
nificance is further emphasized by the consistency of this legal advice [it was never un-
favorable to the contractor] ..•• Such consistency ••• in assiduously avoiding passing 
adversely upon legal matters pertaining to one individual when many of them were ob-
viously contrary to law and the best interests of the Government, is contrary to the rules 
of human conduct developed as the result of experience-unless self interest dictated the 
consistency." 
220 DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 103, 109, lll, ll5 (1953). 
221 United States v. McCluskey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 20 C.M.R. 261 (1955). 
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a lowering of standards in base legal offices. Such lapses, at one 
time winked at, are no longer tolerated.222 Civilian standards of 
attorney responsibility have been assimilated into military law, 
and today they are the norm for all military lawyers. 
V. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Canon 6: 
" ... The obligation to represent the client with undivided 
fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids 
also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment 
from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the 
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed." 
Canon 37: 
"It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confi,-
dences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and ex-
tends as well to his employees; and neither of them should 
accept employment which involves or may involve the dis-
closure or use of these confidences, either for the private ad-
vantage of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage 
of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even 
though there are other available sources of such information. 
A lawyer should not continue employment when he discavers 
that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty 
to his former or to his new client . ... " 
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest types of 
privileged communications known to the common law. "This 
privileged relationship," commented the Judicial Council of the 
Army, "which according to Wigmore, 'goes back to the reign of 
Elizabeth, where it already appears as unquestioned,' has been 
zealously guarded by the courts since the 16th century."223 
Large amounts of material have been written about this facet 
of civilian attorney-client relations, and the desirability of the 
222 Judge Brosman said in United States v. Green, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 18 C.M.R. 234 
.at 242 (1955): "In drafting the provisions of the Uniform Code relating to the appointment 
and duties of counsel, Congress strove to impress on the military establishment the neces-
sity for the very highest standards of professional conduct on the part of legal officers of 
the Armed Forces. Implicit in those provisions, we are sure, is the duty of unswerving and 
undivided loyalty due from defense counsel to an accused person. Indeed the right to 
be represented by counsel-and of necessity by conscientious and scrupulous counsel-is 
paramount among the protections granted an accused by the Uniform Code." 
223 Sp.C.M. 2932, McGill, 10 J.C. 397 at 400 (1951). 
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privilege has been both questioned and defended.224 Regardless, 
however, of views pro or con, "it is clear that this privileged rela-
tionship is equally an integral part of our system of military juris-
prudence,"225 and it constitutes one of the important aspects of 
the relation between a defense counsel and a serviceman-defendant 
before a court-martial. 
In view of the eminence of the many authorities who have com-
mented on this privilege in civilian practice and in light of the 
exhaustive treatment which it has already received at their hands, 
there would be no point in retreading paths so well beaten that 
they are almost eight-lane highways, as little trailblazing can be 
done on a turnpike. Hence, this section will be confined to the 
attorney-client privilege as it affects the military, and as it has been 
interpreted by military tribunals alone. 
A. Historical Basis 
Throughout the sections above, the statement has been made 
that military law and practice follows civilian practice in many of 
its most basic aspects in Anglo-American law, and the attorney-
client privilege in military law development is a good example. 
Such privilege has been as fully honored in military courts as it 
has been in all others. 
The earliest military text-writer to write a substantial book on 
military law, McArthur, declared that in naval court-martial pro-
ceedings "no counsel, or other person intrusted with the secrets of 
the cause by the party himself, shall be compelled, or perhaps 
allowed to give evidence of such conversation or matter of privacy 
as have come to his knowledge by virtue of such trust and con-
fidence, but any counsel, attorney, or other person, may be ex-
amined, as to mere matters of fact which might have come to his 
knowledge without being intrusted in the cause."226 This state-
ment appears in the section on evidence, which section is a virtual 
pocket-sized summary of the then prevailing English law of evi-
224 For some more recent representative comments, see Simons, "Attorney-Client Privi-
lege as Applied to Corporations," 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956); comment, 21 UNIV. Car. L. REv. 
752 (1954); note, 88 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 467 (1940); comment, 36 MICH. L. REv. 641 (1938); 
Radin, "The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client," 16 
CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1928). For some British and Commonwealth commentary, see Cooke, 
"Solicitor and Client," 1954 CAMB. L.J. 156; Hammelman, "Professional Privilege: A Com-
parative Study," 28 CAN. B. REv. 750 (1950); note, 72 S.A.L.J. 15 (1955). And see, generally, 
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2290 et seq. (1940). 
225 C.M. 333433, Alvaro-Rodriguez, 81 B.R. 359 at 363 (1949). 
226 Mc:Aimnm, NAVAL CoURTS·MARTIAL 119 (1792). This is repeated in 2 McARTHUR, 
NAVAL AND MILITARY CoURTS·MARTIAL, 4th ed., 89 (1813). 
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dence before common-law courts. As McArthur was a highly 
respected military law author, both in England and in the United 
States,227 his statement that the attorney-client privilege was al-
lowed before courts-martial at least as early as the close of the 
American Revolution may be taken as authoritative. 
It can thus be seen that the attorney-client privilege found its 
way into military jurisprudence not as an outgrowth of the regula-
tion of the duty of a military defense counsel to his client, for, as 
has been pointed out above, at this time courts-martial on neither 
side of the Atlantic allowed counsel to represent an accused before 
them, but rather as a part of the common-law rules of evidence 
adopted almost in toto by military courts. This view is fortified 
by the numerous references in McArthur as well as in other mili-
tary texts to civilian cases and textbooks without any qualification 
of their authoritative status for use in military trials, and by the 
examples of the application of these evidentiary principles in early 
military texts so largely drawn from criminal law fact patterns. 
Therefore, the application of this privilege was of minor impor-
tance in early military cases. 
The attorney-client privilege, transplanted across the Atlantic 
into American common law, took root also in court-martial prac-
tice as a rule of evidence. Here again, we find military law text-
writers citing civilian sources for their statements of the attorney-
client privilege and applying these statements indiscriminately to 
court-martial practice.228 For example, Harwood, the first Ameri-
can naval law textwriter, relied on Greenleaf on Evidence, the 
standard work of the early nineteenth century in the United States, 
for his statements of this privilege.229 These early writers, it 
should be noted, were making reference to civilian lawyers called 
as witnesses before courts-martial, and hence the occasion for the 
application of the rule remained rare. 
As the practice of allowing defendants before courts-martial 
to defend by counsel became more frequent, however, the attorney-
227 This author was cited, for example, in Grant v. Gould, 2 H. Bl. 69, 126 Eng. Rep. 
434 at 444, 454 (1792); Warden v. Bailey, 4 Taunt. 67, 128 Eng. Rep. 253 at 254, 256, 
257, 261 (1811); Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 89 at 124 (1849); Dynes v. Hoover, 
20 How. (61 U.S.) 65 at 67, 70 (1857); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 at 45 (1866); 
1 Op. Atty. Gen. 166 (Rodney, 1811); 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 714 (Legare, 1841). 
228 See BENET, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAw, 6th ed., 301-303 (1866). 
229 HAR.woon, U.S. NAVAL COURTS-MARTIAL 216 (1867): "Counselors, attorneys or so-
licitors are neither obliged nor permitted to disclose information, or produce papers, 
received in their professional capacity from their clients ...• The protection given by the 
law to confidential communications, is not affected by any change of relations between 
the attorney and his client; but remains forever, unless removed by the consent of the 
client." 
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client privilege became more meaningful in military trials. Thus 
Ives, the first standard textwriter to contend that accused is en-
titled to counsel as of right, after describing the attorney-client 
privilege in respect to civilian practitioners, also argued that "In 
courts-martial, where officers and soldiers are often employed as 
counsel, the privilege of not testifying should be extended to 
them."2ao 
By the time of the first World War, the application of the 
attorney-client privilege to military counsel had become firmly 
fixed. Thus naval practice manuals made reference to it,231 and 
the first full-blown naval equivalent of the manual for courts-
martial specifically referred to military defense counsel.232 The 
scope of the privilege followed the civilian law closely.233 
The first major army manual for courts-martial also incor-
porated the attorney-client privilege into its evidence section, 
much as it is found in civilian practice.234 This is not surprising, 
for Dean John H. Wigmore wrote this section of that manual while 
on active duty with the Judge Advocate General's Department.235 
With the advent of both right to counsel and the duty of the con-
vening authority to appoint counsel, such section, of course, also 
applied to military defense counsel. 
The attorney-client privilege, as now defined in the Manual 
for Courts-Martial, applies alike to both military as well as civilian 
counsel.236 It is likewise found in British military law, but in a 
less developed form.237 Thus, this privilege has historically been 
230 IVES, MILITARY LAw 332 (1879). 
231 See FORMS OF PROCEDURE FOR COURTS AND BOARDS IN THE NAVY 143 (1910); FORMS 
OF PROCEDURE FOR COURTS AND BOARDS IN TIIE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 107 (1916). 
232 NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS, iJl57, p. 162 (1917). 
233 NAVAL COURTS AND BoARDS, §239, p. 162 (1937), declares: "Testimony of counsel 
as to matters communicated to him by the accused will not be heard. It does not matter 
that the counsel does not act as such at the trial; it is enough that he has been consulted 
as a tentative counsel. If the accused personally agree that such testimony be competent, 
it becomes so." 
234 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1917, ,i227, p. 113. See also MANUAL FOR CoURTS-
MARTIAL, 1921, 11227, p. 191. 
235 Introduction to the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1917, p. XIV; 
Brown, "Administration of Justice in the Army," 3 CoRN. L.Q. 178 at 202 (1918). 
236 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, 11102b, 151b (2), PP· 173, 285. 
237 The 1956 MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw, Part I, 11111, p. 97 declares: "A legal adviser 
is not permitted, whether during or after the termination of his employment as such, 
unless with his client's express consent, to disclose any communication, oral or docu-
mentary, made to him as such legal adviser, by or on behalf of his client during, in the 
course of, and for the purpose of his employment. • • • The expression 'legal adviser' 
includes barristers and solicitors, their clerks, and interpreters between them and their 
clients. Justice would seem to require that this expression should also include 'defending 
officers.' This privilege can be waived by the accused.'' See also 1956 MANUAL OF AIR 
FoRCE LAw 112. 
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a rule of evidence before military courts. It remained for recent 
decisions to enlarge its scope and policy basis so that it became a 
significant part of the relation and duty of the military attorney to 
his serviceman-client. 
B. Relation and Communication Protected 
In determining the scope and function of the attorney-client 
privilege as it applies to military jurisprudence, the first proper 
subject of inquiry is what relations and communications the mili-
tary law protects under the cover of this privilege. As noted above, 
the Manual for Courts-Martial mentions specifically only trial and 
appellate defense counsel. 
While only defense counsel as such are mentioned, it is clear 
that this term includes all assistant defense counsel and other per-
sons acting for or in behalf of accused's defense at any stage of 
court-martial proceedings. In one pre-code case, for example, ac-
cused's company commander, who was the assistant defense counsel 
during the pre-trial investigation of accused's case, went down to 
the stockade and interviewed accused. At trial, he testified for 
the prosecution as to what accused had said. In predicating a 
reversal on the receipt in evidence of what amounted to a complete 
confession by accused, the Board rejected the argument that this 
officer did not come within the scope of the privileged relation-
ship.2as 
From the case above, it can be seen that the scope of the 
privilege is somewhat broader in military law than it is in civilian 
practice, where it is confined in general to members of the bar,239 
in respect to who may act as legal adviser. This is brought out 
even more clearly in United States v. Jenkins.240 Here, accused 
"retained" a certain officer as his "defense counsel," who acted in 
this capacity until accused engaged a civilian attorney several weeks 
later. It was held that in military service there are instances, as 
here, where the law imputes the relationship of attorney and client 
238 C.M. 331574, Lloren, 80 B.R. 61 at 64 (1948), where the Board declared: "The 
great weight of judicial authority, founded upon reasons of public policy, has determined 
the settled doctrine to be that an inviolate privilege attaches to communications between 
attorney and client •••• Here, it appears, an officer had approached an accused soldier in 
the role of advisor and thus obtained his confidence. To thereafter deny an implied rela-
tionship of attorney and client permits a destruction of a delicate and sacred relationship 
which the courts have zealously guarded since the 16th Century." 
239 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2300 (1940). 
240 (A.C.M. 1950) 4 (A.F.)C.M.R. 160. 
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notwithstanding the fact that the officer assumes the "role of ad-
visor" without having been appointed as counsel. 
When these cases are synthesized with United States v. Mc-
Cluskey,241 which struggles to hold that the presence of the ad-
jutant of accused's battalion during part of a conference between 
accused and his ad hoc legal adviser, the legal assistance officer, did 
not remove the protection of the attorney-client privilege, it can be 
seen that the scope of the attorney-client privilege takes on new 
dimensions in military service. 
In viewing that scope, we start out with the general duty of 
protection which a superior owes to a subordinate.242 Reinforcing 
such duty is the specific military policy of encouraging military 
subordinates to confide their problems, even of a personal nature, 
to their superiors.243 Also to be considered are several factors 
indigenous to military service. For example, attorneys, either 
civilian or military, are not as available in military service as they 
are in civilian life. Even if there are attorneys in a neighboring 
town, leave must be obtained to see them, and often permission has 
to be obtained to see the legal assistance officer as well. To secure 
such leave, a serviceman frequently must give the reason for his 
visit and thereby divulge the nature of his problem. In addition, 
he may turn to a superior because he is unaware of the installation's 
legal facilities. And it may also be that the superior will desire to 
accompany the subordinate to the legal office after hearing about 
the problem as in the McCluskey case, and it is much more difficult 
for a subordinate to refuse a military superior than it is for one 
civilian to refuse another. In all of these situations, it would seem 
that the general rule of military law casting a veil of privacy over 
information of a personal nature coming to a superior from a 
subordinate in the course of the farmer's duties should apply 
here.244 
241 Note 206 supra. 
242 See Avins, "The Joker in Jester-The Parris Island Death March Case," 53 N.W. 
UNIV. L. REv. 33 (1958). 
243 C.M. 277458, Patnode, 51 B.R. 131 (1945). And in United States v. Fair, 2 
U.S.C.M.A. 521, IO C.M.R. 19 (1953), Chief Judge Quinn observed at p. 26: "We agree, 
with the board of review below, that there .is even more reason in the military than in 
the civil sphere to encourage complete disclosure to his attorney by an individual in the 
armed forces accused of crime. There is a natural reluctance on the part of an enlisted 
man to supply details of possible wrongdoing to a superior officer. Without full knowledge 
of all the facts, an officer selected or appointed as counsel cannot adequately prepare a 
proper defense. It is, therefore, our view that the rule, grounded as it is in policy reasons 
even more sound in the military than in the civilian community, should be strictly 
enforced and not relaxed." 
244 See E.T.O. 9542, Isenberg, 21 E.T.O. 73 (1945). 
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There is civilian precedent for the above view. In Bowers v. 
State/46 it was held that the presence of the mother of the young 
prosecutrix in a rape case, during the consultation, did not destroy 
the privilege. As subordinates are often as much in the legal 
power of their superiors as wards are of their guardians, it should 
be held that where a superior who would normally have a sig-
nificant influence over the conduct of a subordinate's affairs ac-
companies such subordinate to a legal adviser, that the superior 
acts as agent of or co-adviser to the subordinate, and the attor-
ney-client privilege arises. Likewise, it should also be held that 
where a subordinate asks advice of a legal or quasi-legal nature 
from a superior to whom he would normally turn for such advice, 
or reveals information to enable him to procure advice elsewhere, 
the attorney-client privilege should protect the information. 
Aside from the broadening of the attorney-client privilege made 
necessary to secure the benefit of legal services to members of the 
armed forces, the military rule regarding what relations and com-
munications are protected follows the civilian pattern closely. 
Thus, it has been held that where the employment of an attorney 
has not been specifically contracted, the revelation of confidences 
from an accused to the attorney and his reception thereof with 
full understanding by both that these matters are confidential will 
bring them within the privilege.246 Moreover, it has been held 
· that the communications protected include documents necessarily 
transmitted to the attorney by the client to complete his picture 
of the case.247 But an old naval. case notes that letters from an 
officer to his attorney-in-fact do not come within the privilege.248 
Thus, the few cases in the military dealing with the initiation of 
the relationship and the communications protected follow civilian 
law closely. 
C. Types of Leakage Prohibited 
I. Before and During Trial. The protection encompassed in 
the attorney-client privilege in civilian practice is mainly con-
cerned with preventing the attorney from taking the witness stand 
and divulging the contents of confidential communications.249 
While the military attorney is equally forbidden to divulge the 
245 29 Ohio St. 542 (1876). 
246 United States v. Brown, (A.C.M. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 823. 
247United States v. Marrelli, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 276, 15 C.M.R. 276 at 287 (1954). 
248 C.M.O. 5-1917, p. 1. 
249 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2324 (1940). 
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accused's confidences in court, either on or off the stand,250 the 
privilege has wider application because of the sometimes differing 
roles which a military lawyer is required to play. 
For example, indirect disclosure of accused's confidences is also 
prohibited. Thus, where accused's pre-trial counsel sat as a mem-
ber of the court trying accused, the Board of Review postulated 
that he "discussed the charges with accused, considered the ac-
cused's explanation ... and undoubtedly became aware of facts 
and acquired information from the accused which were in the 
nature of privileged communications." Noting that his testimony 
in court as to these facts for the prosecution would have resulted 
in prejudicial error, the Board declared that there was "no real 
distinction" between receiving his testimony and placing him on 
the court and reversed the conviction.251 Here, the danger of leak-
age was great, because not only would the officer be influenced by 
confidential information in making up his own mind, but he might 
well disclose it in discussion while the court was deliberating. 
Indirect disclosure may also result from subsequent activities 
of accused's former defense counsel in aid of the prosecution. 
Thus, the action of a lawyer who had formerly given accused legal 
assistance in procuring depositions for the prosecution which sup-
plied proof of an offense revealed to such officer by the accused 
in his consultations constituted prohibited indirect leakage.252 
Likewise, accused's pre-trial counsel was held to have improperly 
written a memorandum of testimony which would probably be 
offered against him.253 In both of these cases, a reversal followed 
notwithstanding the contention that counsel were engaged in ad-
ministrative tasks, and hence the leakage would be, presumably, 
de minimis. 
Of course, the clearest example of indirect leakage occurs when 
the accused's ex-counsel uses the fruits of his confidences on trial. 
Thus, in United States v. Fair,254 an important prosecution witness 
in a murder case had been a suspect in pre-trial investigation but 
was granted full immunity. During cross-examination, the defense 
250 E.T.O. 13222, Howard, 26 E.T.O. 197 (1945). 
251 Sp.C.M. 2932, McGill, IO J.C. 397 (1951). 
252United States v. McCluskey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 20 C.M.R. 261 (1955). 
253 United States v. Green, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 18 C.M.R. 234 (1955). The court declared 
at p. 241 that "if a military accused person is to rely on the professional responsibility 
and integrity of counsel, the confidence reposed in the latter must not be shattered by the 
fear that the confidant may be assigned subsequently to duties involving adversity to the 
interests of his one-time client." 
254 United States v. Fair, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 521, IO C.M.R. 19 (1953). 
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counsel, who was the witness's pre-trial counsel, asked the witness 
if he had not told him that he, the witness, had fired the fatal shot. 
The law officer precluded this line of inquiry by permitting the 
witness to rely on the attorney-client privilege, and this was upheld 
on appeal. The Court of Military Appeals held: 
"It is our opinion that any forced admission of statements 
made under a belief of security from subsequent disclosure is 
certain to damage the sound policy which dictates enforce-
ment of the attorney-client privilege. We are not persuaded 
that immunity from prosecution removes the reason for en-
forcing the privilege. In our opinion, the injury that would 
inure to the attorney-client relation by the disclosure of the 
thought-to-be-privileged communication is greater than the 
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."255 
Hence, it would appear that military law prohibits indirect leakage 
of a serviceman's confidences before or during trial on the widest 
possible front. 
2. Post-Trial Revelations. The one area where military deci-
sions have most expanded the attorney-client privilege has been 
in the case of post-trial revelations. Here again, the privilege's 
increase in scope is due to the multi-functioned role of a military 
lawyer. 
The expansion of this privilege by a series of recent cases has 
been most pronounced in respect to the post-trial clemency report, 
used by the convening authority to determine what sentence shall 
finally be approved. At first, several cases merely held that where 
accused's former defense counsel conducts the post-trial interview 
and makes recommendations unfavorable to the accused's interests, 
since it is possible that these recommendations are based on infor-
mation which accused revealed to the attorney in confidence dur-
ing their prior relationship, such recommendation might consti-
tute indirect leakage of confidential information.256 Hence, as one 
Board noted, "we are so impressed with the necessity that the 
attorney-client relationship and the privileges attendant on it re-
main immaculate, we are convinced that any review at convening 
authority level which is predicated in whole or in part upon a 
255 Id. at 26. 
256 United States v. Bryant, (A.C.M. 1954) 16 C.M.R. 747; United States v. Marquez, 
(A.C.M.S. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 736. 
1960] MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL 401 
fundamental violation of that privilege must likewise be blem-
ished.':257 
The rule of the above case was soon broadened, however, to 
encompass any case where counsel conducts the post-trial inter-
view, the rationale being that accused may not realize that his 
former counsel has switched roles and may therefore reveal to such 
interviewer additional confidential facts.258 In order to protect the 
accused from this further possibility of post-trial indirect leakage, 
military law will trace the infected information into all possible 
channels and pronounce such channels of information polluted. 
Hence, reports which draw any information from such channels 
will likewise be blemished, and fresh proceedings will have to be 
initiated at that point.259 
Since post-trial indirect leakage is banned, a fortiori post-trial 
direct leakage is also forbidden.260 Thus, the military law seeks 
to insulate the serviceman-client's confidences from revelation at 
any time by a military lawyer. In doing so, it carries out both the 
letter and spirit of the Canons of Ethics which make the preserva-
tion of confidences a duty incumbent on a lawyer at all times. 
D. Exceptions to the Privilege 
In defining what situations will create exceptions to the attor-
ney-client privilege, military jurisprudence follows the civilian 
practice quite closely without significant difference. 
The first exception to the rule of the attorney-client privilege, 
or, more properly, situation outside of the rule completely, occurs 
where the attorney testifies to knowledge which he gained inde-
pendently of any communications to him from the accused. Thus, 
where the prosecution calls counsel as a witness, he may relate 
events which occurred prior to his acting as counsel and which he 
257 United States v. Bryant, (A.C.M. 1954) 16 C.M.R. 747 at 753. 
258 United States v. Brown, (A.C.M. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 823; United States v. Vinson, 
(A.C.M. 1955) 19 C.M.R. 919. In the latter case, the Board declared at p. 923: "As accused 
may have considered Major S still acting as his counsel during the post trial interview, 
it is possible that accused related material which he, accused, would have told only to his 
counsel. Consequently in accused's eyes the information would have been privileged. 
Hence while not sure whether S received privileged communications during the interview-
at least privileged in accused's mind-we hold that the appearance of evil is independently 
sufficient in this factual pattern to require remedial action." 
259 United States v. Draper, (A.C.M.S. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 743 at 747. 
200 United States v. Casey, (A.C.M.S. 1955) 20 C.M.R. 853; United States v. Quindana, 
(A.C.M. 1953) 12 C.M.R. 790 at 794. 
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did not obtain knowledge of from the accused.261 For example, 
certification of accused's records by defense counsel is not error 
because this is a matter of official record.262 Likewise, no error is 
committed if accused's former defense counsel swears to charges 
against accused based on official reports of investigation coming 
to him by virtue of his official position.263 And the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals has held that there was no breach of the attorney-
client privilege in a worthless check case where the accused gave 
his attorney money to buy back the checks which antedated the 
relationship, and the attorney acted as agent in buying up the 
checks, because he later delivered them to the prosecution at its 
request. The court reasoned that there was no confidentiality since 
the checks came from independent sources.264 
Another exception to the attorney-client privilege occurs when 
the defendant accuses his counsel of wrongdoing or negligence.265 
Counsel may then defend himself, and in so doing reveal confi-
dences, for the accused is, by his own action, held to have im-
pliedly waived the privilege. Thus, in one case where the defense 
offered no evidence on trial, after trial the accused made a state-
ment to the chaplain which indicated a defense. This was related 
to the staff judge advocate, who questioned the defense counsel 
about it. Counsel replied that he attempted to verify the statement, 
but was forced to discard it as a defense. The Board held, in accord-
ance with civilian precedents, that since the accused had imputed 
a breach of duty to raise the defense at trial to his counsel, he was 
permitted to reply and thus refute the assertion.266 
Finally, accused may waive the privilege by putting his counsel 
on the stand as a witness.267 This, too, is the civilian rule. Hence, 
it can be seen that the few military cases dealing with exceptions 
to the attorney-client privilege, like most of those which deal with 
the privilege itself, do not differ materially from the pattern laid 
down in civilian precedents. 
261 C.M. 327221, McGuire, 76 B.R. 59 (1948); C.M. 341018, Melton, 7 J.C. l (1950); 
United States v. Gandy, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 355, 26 C.M.R. 135 (1958). 
262 United States v. Quincy, (A.C.M. 1954) 18 C.M.R. 694; United States v. Thomas, 
(A.C.M.S. 1954) 18 C.M.R. 610. 
263 United States v. Jenkins, (A.C.M. 1950) 4 (A.F.)C.M.R. 160. 
264 United States v. Marrelli, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 276, 15 C.M.R. 276 (1954). See also United 
States v. Buck, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 290, 26 C.M.R. 70 (1958). 
265 United States v. Harris, (A.C.M. 1957) 24 C.M.R. 698, citing Canon 37. 
266 United States v. Reynolds, (A.C.M. 1955) 19 C.M.R. 850. 
267 C.M.O. 10-1930, p. 17; C.M.O. 4-1943, p. 36. 
1960] MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL 403 
E. The Privilege as Enforcement of Counsel's Duty 
The practice of a military attorney and that of the typical 
civilian attorney differ greatly. The average civilian lawyer, be he 
in a law firm or in individual practice, is much like the family 
doctor: he ministers to the legal ills of his individual or corporate 
clients year in and year out, living on the fees from his practice. 
Many lawyers have retainers from their clients, and do legal work 
for them all year round; others get repeat business, either from 
the client previously served or from people he recommends. In 
either case, the success, and even the very livelihood of the attor-
ney, depends on the goodwill of his clients. Since the disclosure 
of confidential information, however innocently, would tend to 
shatter such personal ties, and thus deprive the lawyer of both 
clients and income, he has a powerful incentive to obey scrupu-
lously the injunctions in Canon 37.268 
The military attorney has a much different practice. His salary 
is not related to his success on trial or to the number of service-
men who come to consult him. Furthermore, the frequent rotation 
of personnel, both legal as well as non-legal, means that his cases 
are basically "one-shot deals." More often than not he will never 
see his client again, and referrals constitute a minute portion of 
his practice. He renders a single service only; there is no personal 
tie between him and the accused as there is between a family lawyer 
and his client or even a firm and the executives of a corporation 
retaining it. 
And yet the military lawyer can sometimes cause a serviceman 
much more harm than a civilian practitioner can to his clients. A 
serviceman's superiors determine his duties, his location, where 
he lives, when he gets leave, how fast he is promoted, and many 
more things which can make military life either pleasant or intol-
erable. A confidence carelessly related by the attorney to one of 
the man's superiors may block a promotion, better duty assign-
ment, or other advancement desired by his erstwhile client, and 
the client will never know what hit him. A loose-tongued attorney 
who serves tidbits of gossip containing confidences of servicemen 
in the chatter of the officers' club may wound his client just as 
severely as if he spread it forth in the post general orders or shouted 
it in a courtroom. And the seal of secrecy is not preserved from 
breaking by a little indiscretion through the knowledge that the 
morrow will find terrible retribution when a long-valued and well-
268 For a general discussion of bar association opinions on the attorney-client privilege, 
see DRINKER, LF.GAL ETHICS 131 (1953). 
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paying client takes his business to a lawyer who can keep his lips 
sealed. 
True it is that the attorney-client privilege, even in its most 
expanded form, cannot guard against such tongue-wagging, but 
its recent expansion in the military to cover all types of leakage 
which operate to the detriment of an accused serves as a constant 
reminder to the attorney of his obligation of secrecy. Today, the 
privilege rightly goes beyond a mere rule of evidence in the mili-
tary. Rather, it constitutes the living and practical embodiment of 
the duty of counsel to a serviceman to preserve his confidences. In 
thus elevating the standards of the military bar, it keeps those 
standards in line with the best thinking in the legal profession as 
a whole. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Military law, like the criminal law generally, seeks to deter 
members of the service from committing acts which are detrimen-
tal to a military organization. Unlike the general administration 
of criminal justice, however, it is geared to a speedier pace. More-
over, there is no figure in a court-martial with quite the prestige 
and power of a judge to assure an accused of all of his rights which 
the law guarantees to him. The keystone, therefore, upon which 
the vindication of accused's rights rests is his defense counsel. A 
military attorney in such a role has a vital part to play in the ad-
ministration of military justice. It is often his activities which spell 
the difference between equal justice under law and the exercise 
of arbitrary power. 
To insure the proper performance of that role, the military 
law has assimilated civilian concepts of attorney-client relation-
ships. More specifically, it has adopted the rules of the Canons of 
Professional Ethics and applied them as ,the yardsticks by which 
the duty of a military attorney to his client may be measured. The 
various aspect& of that duty each serve a useful purpose in civilian 
practice and in military practi~e as well. Indeed, because of the 
lack of other ties to his client, the strict fulfillment of the require-
ment of these Canons is, if anything, even more necessary in the 
military than it is in civilian practice. These several obligations 
define the duty of a military attorney toward his client. Their 
performance will result in that satisfaction which an attorney gets 
in doing his duty with "professional skill and moderation."269 
269 Rex ex rel. Peters v. Harrison, [1944] 1 W.W.R. 353, 52 Man. R. 28, 81 C.C.C. 215, 
[1944] 2 DL.R. 597. 
